Istanbul's Pasts: Raw Material for Constructing the City's Future

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During the ongoing phase of economic and political globalization, 'global cities', i.e. a select number of perhaps three dozen cities across the world, have emerged as important relay stations for the management, communication and financing of multinational business. This has led to a financial as well as ideological valorization of the cities concerned vis-à-vis the countries and regions they are located in. As these cities grow to produce the lion's share of their country's gross domestic product, attract a considerable percentage of both the white- and blue-collar mobile labour force and experience rapid increases in the prices of immobile property and services, the vision of the city, the self-perception of its inhabitants and the control of the public space gain tremendously in importance. Saskia Sassen has claimed that in such globalized cites a 'centrality of space' evolves 'in the formation of new claims and hence in the constitution of entitlements, notably rights to place, and, at the limit, in the constitution of "citizenship"'.

In this reading, urban conflicts are not only a continuation of national politics entwined with local grievances, but also a struggle for recognition in the new economic world order. Istanbul has and continues to see its share of conflicts over such entitlements; municipal issues become the object of principal conflicts here. Since it is by far the largest city in the country, as well as the richest, economically and intellectually most productive, and the only one that is seen from outside the country as a 'global city', it is both the most important site to occupy in order to have leverage in domestic politics and at the same time the decisive locus from where to determine how Turkey should portray itself to the rest of the world. The question of how the globalizing city is to be shaped has become a major question as to how people wish to shape their lives. As Asu Aksoy states,

The 'projected city' is a collection of gentrified spaces, and the cultural imaginary is increasingly being shaped by this project of gentrification. What is significant is the relentless ascendancy of this imaginary.... this process brings together very different constituencies with diverse lifestyles, values, beliefs and practices. It represents a coalition of self-interests involving

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Islamic communities, secular elites, large capital, small and conservative business interests, and so-called bourgeois bohemians…. They now share a common aspiration and a vision of Istanbul as a globalised and gentrified city with orderly and clean public spaces and residential quarters, and an attractive public image with world-class services and goods.\(^3\)

Two modifications must be added to Aksoy's assessment of the impact of globalization on Istanbul. First, she stresses the collaborative aspect of Istanbul citizens uniting across ideological and lifestyle boundaries to shape the face of the city. By contrast I find that, while many citizens will welcome some form of change for Istanbul, the overall process is far from harmonious. Conflicts over the future face of the city are numerous, as I will demonstrate. Second, Aksoy portrays the making of the globalized city as a predominantly elite and semi-elite project. I would claim that while elites in business, administration and intellectual production may play decisive roles in indicating specific development paths for a city, any urban society will create a certain degree of material and symbolic participation for the mass of its inhabitants, a convincing integrative vision, as the functioning of the global city depends in no small part on this.\(^4\) In the case of Istanbul, a particular importance in creating an integrative vision has fallen to the realms of identity, which in turn strongly relies on history.

Creating a convincing self-identity plays an important role in laying claim to a legitimate presence and participation in the public sphere in the post-modern era. Common origins have taken priority over common material interests, identity over class to organize collective agency. In Turkey, issues such as the public use of headscarves, alcohol and language as markers of a particular identity seem to have taken precedence over overtly material conflicts, which find little space for articulation in the public sphere, let alone party politics. Religion, ethnicity and the state, on the other hand, have served as raw material to create new identities for the twenty-first century that seem to form a continuity with older self-images, but in fact have been decidedly altered so as to speak to present-day expectations.\(^5\)

To successfully construct a collective identity, most will sort through the rubble of past ages to find an object to serve as a rallying point for likeminded people.\(^6\) This is of special relevance for Istanbul. Having repeatedly in its nearly

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4 Saskiv, 'Whose City Is It?' Examples of global cities that have collapsed at least temporarily because of failure to provide for the participation of wide parts of their inhabitants are Los Angeles in 1992 and Bangkok in 2010.


6 Victor Turner, *Dramas, Fields and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974). Public interest in history, it has often been stated, has risen considerably in recent decades; see Pierre Nora, 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire', *Representations* 26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory (Spring 1989): 7-24. While perhaps forty years ago
1,700 years as a metropolis achieved the status of one of the foremost centres of political and military might, ecclesiastical authority, trade and the arts in Europe and the Middle East, Istanbul's past tends to intrude onto the present more vigorously than it does in less prominent sites; construction, transport, recreation, even garbage collection – none of these issues can be discussed without constant reference to the past. The question is not whether or not political activists or commentators discussing urban politics draw upon the city's history; the question is rather on which of the multitude of elements of the urban past they choose to base their worldview. In the following, I will portray four different historical visions of Istanbul and how they serve to create 'usable pasts' in the present. I have tentatively named these four history discourses Konstantinoupolis, Islambol, the Poli and Istanbul not Constantinople in accordance with different historical names of the city. I will focus on the empirical base of each construction and investigate what potential and what limits it has for founding myths of 'imagined communities'. I will then briefly discuss how these different visions of the past relate to one another. It should be explicitly stated that while party politics naturally plays a strong role in the formation and sustaining of such visions, the visions presented here do not necessarily coincide with party constituencies.

**Konstantinoupolis: The city at the height of the Eastern Roman Empire**

'But now we must proceed, as I have said, to the subject of the buildings of this Emperor, so that it may not come to pass in the future that those who see them refuse, by reason of their great number and magnitude, to believe that they are in truth the works of one man.…. And with good reason the buildings in Byzantium, beyond all the rest, will serve as a foundation for my narrative. For 'o'er a work's beginnings', as the old saying has it, 'we needs must set a front that shines afar'.

According to recent archaeological findings, an enclosed settlement within the territory of the later city of Byzantium existed already by 6000 BC. Several fortified settlements existed on both sides of the Bosporus Straits in later historical times and enjoyed a certain degree of importance due to their strategic location on the land route between the Balkans and Anatolia and on the sea route between the Black Sea and the Marmara and Aegean seas, but this never resulted in a strong political role until Emperor Constantine I (306-337), looking for a strategically
well defendable and economically profitable location for a new capital of the Roman Empire, chose Byzantium as his 'Nova Roma'. The city became an instant success and soon grew by migration to be the largest city in Europe and the Middle East, surpassed only in later centuries by Baghdad. The already impressive constructions under Constantine were surpassed by his successors, especially by Theodosios II (408-450), Justinian I (527-565) and the Komnenos dynasty (1081-1185). Fortifications, water supply (aqueducts, cisterns), triumphal roads, arches, public entertainment (hippodrome), imperial palaces, and places of worship were among the most sophisticated and monumental that could be found in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The state the city ruled between 330 and 1453 fluctuated several times between world empire, regional power and mere city-state, but the outstanding feature of the Eastern Roman Empire was its longevity, surpassing practically all other states of its age, until it was conquered by the Ottoman Empire.

It cannot be said that Konstantinoupolis enjoys great popularity in present-day Istanbul. While from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth century there had been a patriotic movement that had viewed the Ottoman Empire as a direct continuation of Eastern Rome, this was soon eclipsed by pan-Islamic and pan-Turanian identities adopted by Turkish nationalism. Any direct link to the city's pre-Ottoman past appeared as a threat, as this seemed to justify the megalı idea, i.e. Greek-nationalist ambitions to recreate an empire centred on Constantinople. Accordingly the Turkish Republic in its early years devoted much of its archaeological activities to demonstrating that the Constantinople-based Christian empire was but one of many civilizations to rule Anatolia. Byzantine studies as a discipline was marginalized in Turkish academia by subsuming it under the wider field of 'Anatolian civilizations'. In doing so Turkish academia could build on the traditionally low esteem the so-called Byzantine Empire enjoyed in Western Europe. This attitude is reflected in the permanent exhibition 'Istanbul through

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9 Other investigated sites include Thessalonica, Serdica (now Sofia) and Troy, all located on important Roman highway intersections, along strategic sea routes or both.


12 Aslı Iğsız, 'Personifying History and Reconsidering Ruptures in Contemporary Turkey', paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle Eastern Studies Association, Boston, 23 November 2009.

13 In many West or Central European languages 'Byzantine' is a derogatory term. In English, for example, two of the possible six meanings are indicated as 'complex or intricate' and 'characterized by elaborate scheming and intrigue, esp. for the gaining of political power or favor'; Byzantine. Dictionary.com,
the Ages' in the Archaeological Museum: while there is no mention of either Constantine I or Justinian I, a plate explains that Mehmed II through his conquest saved the city from decline. Accordingly remnants of Eastern Rome appear to most Istanbullus today not as part of their heritage but as an alien culture. However, the city's pre-Ottoman legacy has fought back against this disrespect with a vengeance. On Barak has recently pleaded against 'anthropocentrism' in the history of the city, arguing to include the agency of the non-sentient, material elements of the urban environment, 'the most repressed ensemble of its voices – the clangs and echoes of the materials and networks themselves, which have so far always been upstaged by the human, social, and political main issues'. If one chooses to follow this approach, the material legacy of Konstantinoupolis has an important part to play in today's Istanbul. For wherever one chooses to dig a hole, after a few metres one will inevitably encounter the debris of past centuries. And these are mostly pre-Ottoman.

The equation is quite simple: the city was the capital of Eastern Rome for 1,123 years; by contrast, it has been under Ottoman/Turkish rule for not even half that length. Accordingly, Byzantine remnants intervene in modern-day life, when the city inhabitants strive for amenities such as car, subway or railway tunnels, car-parks, multi-floor shopping centres, or skyscrapers. The most spectacular recent case was the construction site of the underground train and subway station Yenikapi, where to the dismay of the constructors, the Port of Theodosios I, built in the second half of the fourth century and used until the thirteenth century, was 'discovered'. The oldest remaining wall of Konstantinoupolis, one church, 36 sunken boats with cargo, 177 human skeletons, 22,000 animal skeletons and a total of 25,000 artefacts were found at the excavation site. The city's and the empire's history will have to be rewritten following the results of the archaeological analysis. The excavation stalled the railway tunnel construction by four and a half years, additional construction costs of U.S. $ 500 million had to be taken into account and the previously planned huge train station will have to be downsized to accommodate an archaeological exhibition hall.


14 Istanbul Archaeological Museum, 'Istanbul through the Ages' (permanent exhibition). In the more recent exhibitions on the excavation of Theodosios' Port and on Byzantine Palaces (summer 2010), the museum shows a greater interest in the pre-Ottoman past.


16 As so often with discoveries, this one was not a real surprise. Archaeological maps had beforehand accurately demarcated the very spot of 'Theodosios's Port', which had only been filled in at a late date.

17 Excavations were still ongoing at the time of writing and these figures will have in the end been surpassed; 'Marmaray'ı da İlginç Şeyler Çıkıyor', Turktime, 25 December 2009; Hamdi Ateş, 'Marmaray 2013'e sarktı, fatura 500 milyon $ daha kabardı', Sabah, 29 December 2009; Jürgen Bischoff, 'Brückenschlag unter Wasser', Rheinischer Merkur, 17 December 2009.
Strictly speaking, by themselves the remains of the fallen empire would not have the agency to interfere in urban developments on such a large scale. While remnants of Konstantinoupolis have resurfaced during earlier construction projects inside the city walls, such as the huge thoroughfares of Aksaray and Vatan Caddesi and in private construction, less diligence has been (and in some cases, continues to be) exercised in their preservation. In particular many of the nigh-omnipresent cisterns have had to make way for underground parking.\(^{18}\) But this was during a phase when nationalist disdain for the Constantinopolitan past was on a par with ‘urban anarchy', the deregulated and wilful destruction of the city to build it anew that prevailed between 1950 and 1990.\(^{19}\)

The circumstances today are quite different. The turn to so-called neo-liberal economic policies has ironically laid the ground for a new massive intervention of the state into the city's affairs.\(^{20}\) Both the national and the municipal government aim to promote Istanbul as a site of tourism and of global finance. ‘Cultural capital' in this respect is understood not as an abstract Bourdieu-ian category but quite literally as culture that can be used to produce financial surplus. Culture and tourism are combined in one national ministry, and the purpose of preserving and developing archaeological sites is, among others, to use them to increase the number of tourist visits to Istanbul.\(^{21}\) On the other hand, the cultural capital of a location has become an important factor for deciding on opening branches of globally operating companies. The ideal city as perceived by investors, managers and chief executives 'consists of airports, top level business districts, top of the line-hotels and restaurants, a sort of urban glamour zone' that includes 'world-class culture'.\(^{22}\) A. T. Kearney, an institution that ranks global cities, explains the measurability of cultural capital as follows: 'Cultural experience includes the number of international travellers coming to the city, performing arts venues and international shows that utilize the venues, museums, international sporting events and the diversity and quality of the culinary scene'.\(^{23}\)

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\(^{20}\) Aksoy, ‘Istanbul’s Choice'; Sassen, 'Whose City Is It?'

\(^{21}\) The ministry hoped to boost tourism in Istanbul from 7.5 million visitors in 2009 to 10 million in 2010. While falling short of this goal, a rise in visits is predicted in the long run; Jürgen Mittag, 'Istanbul and Essen/Ruhr 2010 as European Capitals of Culture: Common and Different Features', paper presented at the conference on ‘Urban Landscapes of Modernity: Istanbul and the Ruhr Area', Istanbul Bilgi University, 17 December 2010.

\(^{22}\) Sassen, ‘Whose City Is It?'

\(^{23}\) AT Kearney, 'New Comprehensive Ranking'. Istanbul’s greatest deficit in this perspective is the lack of a permanent stage for an opera (opera and ballet had been one of the mainstays of the Atatürk Cultural Center, closed since 2008). The 2010 Capital of Cultures program included an opera festival at changing venues in the city.
In other words, it is important that the spouses or partners of executives do not get bored in the city, that visiting business partners can be shown an urban panorama that is to their liking, and that they can be taken to an enjoyable meal. While the Ottoman heritage can serve these purposes to a point, by itself it would prove insufficient to keep the demanding executives and tourists entertained. Therefore the Hagia Sophia, the Basilica Cistern, the Chora Church and the city fortifications must be mobilized, and if possible, the standard tour of East Roman sights must be extended. Much of the renovation efforts leading up to the 2010 European Capital of Culture concentrated on less well-known Constantinopolitan sights, such as the Pantokrator Church and the nearby cisterns, the Sergios and Bakchos Church and the ongoing excavation in the area of the former imperial grand palace. On the other hand, it seems there are still apprehensions about giving the Byzantine legacy too prominent a place in the city. In this way Konstantinoupolis, while insufficient as a source of identity, plays a role in the city today, as annoying interference in the city's urban development on the one side, as a commodified asset in global capitalism on the other.

**Islambol: The city as capital of an Islamic empire**

*To live in Istanbul turns me into a lover torn between two lovers. Vexed, I turn to Justinian on the one hand, then to Fatih Sultan Mehmet, the Conqueror, on the other.*

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On 29 May 1453 the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II entered the city of Constantinople by force. The Eastern Roman Empire, having already shrunk to the size of a city-state, was thus ended and the city became the residence of the Ottoman Sultans. From here they expanded their rule from Hungary to Yemen and from the Caucasus to North Africa. The Sultans later (in 1517) also assumed the title of Caliph, and Islam was the official state doctrine. Christians and Jews were as a rule not forcefully converted, and their communities enjoyed official status; however, they were severely limited in the exercise of their religion, dress, use of arms and horses, and paid an additional tax. It would go beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the role of Islam in the Ottoman Empire, as this is a multifaceted and much discussed topic. In the capital city, Christians and Jews continued to exist as large communities. The city's name in the Turkish vernacular became 'Istanbul', adopted from Greek (eis tan polin 'towards the City'; 'the City'

24 The director of the European Capital of Culture program has blamed the Ministry of Culture for showing disinterest in the plan to upgrade the Byzantine collection in the Archaeological Museum to an independent Byzantine Museum located prominently in the courtyard of the now closed Hagia Irene Church; Suay Aksoy, 'Bizans müzesi kurulacak mı?', *Radikal*, 6 January 2010, 21.


being synonymous with Constantinople); the official terminology continued for sometime to call it by its old name, turkified as 'Konstantiniye'. In later centuries, attempts were made to give it a more Islamic connotation as Islambol (plenty of Islam, as an alternative etymology for Istanbul), 'Dersaadet' (the threshold of felicity) or other creative names. Almost all major pre-Ottoman churches were eventually converted to mosques, and several new representative mosques were built especially in the sixteenth century. The already decaying imperial palace was not restored, but a new palace was built in its vicinity.

The empire's expansion came to a halt in the sixteenth century and during the eighteenth and especially the nineteenth century it suffered massive territorial losses, until in 1922 the Turkish National Army consolidated the remaining territories and officially changed the political system from multiethnic dynastic empire to republican nation-state. For both strategic and ideological reasons, Istanbul was deprived of its capital status. Strategic, as it was now within easy reach both for an invading army launched from one of the neighbouring states or by an armada arriving from the Aegean or Black Sea; ideological, as the new state wished to distance itself from the empire's dynastic, multiethnic and religious elements.

As is well known, recent decades have seen the rise of a highly successful movement to promote a stronger role for Islam in Turkish politics. This movement succeeded first in municipal politics before making an impact on the central level. According to Cihan Tuğal, Islamist policies in Istanbul from the 1990s onwards developed from the edges of the city inwards.27 The Welfare Party (Refah) found its followers among the recent migrants to the city from conservative inland Anatolia and their families, who make up the majority of the lower-class workforce in the city. Most of these recent arrivals settled in new communities far from the city centre. As leftist, fascist, Kurdish-nationalist and Alevi-centred movements have only attracted temporary or factional solidarity among them, pro-Islamic parties have been ruling the city since 1994 without interruption.

The city the Islamist parties of the 1990s tried to create was not bound to an imagined past. Instead they pursued an ahistorically purist, i.e. reformist approach, trying to create an ideal Islamic city. According to Matthew Gagne, much of this took the form of a rebellion against the previous republican reordering of the urban space. Taksim Square – seen as the city's hub since republican times, but devoid of any signs of Islam, as this had been a predominantly Christian neighbourhood in imperial times – was to have been filled up with a monumental mosque. Foreign tourists should have been 'reminded that they are in a Muslim city' and to behave accordingly.28 In the Refah-dominated districts on the edge


28 Matthew Gagne, 'Remodeling Turkish Modernity: Neo-Ottomanism and Contested Manifestations of the Ottoman Past', paper presented at the annual meeting of the Middle Eastern Studies Association,
of town, public buildings were to be entered only after removing shoes at the entrance. At the same time, the Islamist movement provided a voice of protest against the unrelenting transformation of the city into a megalopolis. The new citizens of Istanbul favoured the face-to-face institutions, small communities, and buildings of a human dimension which they knew from their rural or small-town background.

While both the Refah Party and its immediate successor, the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, were banned for their overt Islamism, the present Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party, AKP) has avoided a ban because its Islamism is more moderate, or, according to another point of view, more circumspect. One of the main differences is that the AKP has a positive attitude towards globally active capitalism, trying to harness it to its own means rather than oppose it. Accordingly skyscrapers, shopping malls, highway and car-tunnel development have enjoyed the protection of the AKP municipal government in its efforts to propel Istanbul into the premier ranks of global cities. It is striking that a movement that started as a grassroots revolt against the megalopolis now watches on passively as their leaders engage in the same efforts to convert their world into a city serving the interests of big capital.

The reason for this docility might be connected to the other main difference between AKP and Refah, namely, its use of the past. Breaking with the attempt to establish a timeless Islamic city, the AKP followed up on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis, a policy and ideology that had first been explored in the years following the 1980 military coup. In this worldview, Islamic order and Turkish nationalism are no longer opposed to each other. Instead, it is supposed that Islam had a special place for the Turkish nation, as the protector of the true believers. With the waning of Arab military might, the Turks appeared to protect the Arab nation from Western colonialism. The Ottoman Empire is framed as one of the great Muslim empires, besides the Arab, Persian and Mogul ones, and as a successor to the Abbasid rulers in particular. Nationalism, ethnic strife, religious fanaticism as well as laicism were all imports from the West in a bid to bring down this

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Boston, 23 November 2009.

29 Tuğal, ‘Greening of Istanbul’.


31 It must be stated, though, that the accommodating attitude towards global capital is not a particularity of the AKP. In Istanbul districts which are headed by oppositional mayors, investors’ interests are also given preference over public interest; see the Beşiktaş municipality’s plan for reordering the waterfront, for example, discussed in Eser Yağcı, ‘Beşiktaş – Akaretler’, and Emine Merdim Yılmaz, ‘Bir Meydan Iki Tasarım’, both in Gaste 111 (March 2008): 6.
This neo-Ottomanist ideology has had a great impact on municipal politics. In part, it has led to a more conscious effort to restore and preserve the Ottoman architectural legacy, which had suffered greatly during the previous phase of 'urban anarchy'. These efforts are overshadowed, though, by the accommodating attitude of the central and municipal government towards investors, especially in the realty sector, where numerous skyscrapers have appeared that dwarf the once splendid imperial mosques, alongside gated communities of huge residential blocks that have become the AKP’s solution for the housing question. The result is a rather Orientalist package wrapping for twenty-first-century modernity: highways, subway stations and shopping malls are covered with images which ostensibly belong to Turco-Islamic culture. While this imagined Turco-Islamic culture also has little to do with the experienced life worlds of the Istanbullus of Inner Anatolian origins, a large popular and pseudo-academic apparatus informs them that this is their culture. For example, in the spring of 2006, according to official press releases, the city was covered with three million tulips, mostly planted along the major thoroughfares so that commuters would notice them. This event, now annually repeated, is accompanied by a tulip festival and a series of municipal publications trying to prove that the tulip has for centuries been characteristic of Istanbul. Also, newly ordered Alstom metros that will operate as of 2012 in İkitelli, a suburb devoid of Ottoman glamour, display an over-dimensional tulip on the doors. Other references to an imagined Oriental past of the city include the new ferry jetties, replacing the former plain plastic-concrete constructions with concrete with wood-casing, slanted roofs and mosque-like golden crescents on the top.

Cihan Tuğal interprets this overwriting of urban modernity with nostalgic images of an Islamic Ottoman past as a policy of bread and circuses. Drawing a parallel to the eighteenth-century Tulip Period, he stresses that both in that century and today, the city’s upper class engaged in self-indulgence and enjoyed its wealth with little thought to the urban poor. Unlike in the Tulip Period, though, where this oversight led to the destruction of the luxurious new palaces at the hands of

34 An example of how this Islamic decoration overwrites other historical images of the city is the decorated tile panoramas in the entrance to the recently opened subway station Şişhane. While public memory associates the Galata neighbourhood where it is located with the medieval Genoese city here or with the nineteenth-century Ottoman showcase of European-style modernity that was created in this region, the tiles show a purely Oriental surrounding instead, while a smaller number show the emblematic tram of the 1930s; Malte Fuhrmann, ‘Vom stadtpolitischen Umgang mit dem Erbe der Europäisierung in Istanbul, Izmir und Thessaloniki,’ in Ulrike Tischler and Ioannis Zelepos, eds., *Bilderwelten – Weltbilder: Die Gegenwart der Vergangenheit in postosmanischen Metropolen Südosteuropas: Thessaloniki, Istanbul, Izmir* (Vienna: Peter Lang, 2009), 19-62.
the participants of the popular Patrona Halil Uprising, the present administration takes precautions to symbolically involve the larger public in enjoying the city by such measures as the tulip embellishment or lighting up the Bosporus Bridge in bright colours.35 These circuses are accompanied by a moderate dosage of bread, i.e. of public services, that are emphatically promoted by professional PR.36

Another element of these circuses that coincidentally serve to disseminate an Islamo-centric and naïve image of the Ottoman past is the erection of popular history museums by the municipality and the central government. One of these is the Museum of Islamic Sciences, which cannot be discussed here; the other is the Conquest Museum (Fetih Müzesi). Inaugurated in early 2009, its main exhibit is a 360° panoramic painting of Sultan Mehmed’s army taking the city walls by assault in 1453. The museum is extremely well visited, with visitors often waiting for hours before entering the main exhibit.37

Panoramic installations first became popular in the nineteenth century. They played a major role in popularizing colonialism and Orientalism among the West and Central European general population that would never travel to such exotic locations.38 In more recent times, they were in use in the former Soviet Union, from where the Istanbul municipality hired its expertise for the construction of the Conquest Museum. The particular effect they create is, on the one hand, to place the observers in a position where they perceive the spectacle as real: the 360° effect, combined with sound effects, seems more lively than a two-dimensional screen or a museum showcase; on the other hand, the lighting and the overwhelming size of the exhibit, combined with the heroic poses displayed, induce the observers to believe that they are experiencing a larger-than-life situation.

35 Tuğal, ‘Greening of Istanbul’.
36 Besides the municipality’s actual distribution of bread at discounted prices, other public services must be seen in this light, such as in traffic infrastructure. The lion’s share of the investment budget for traffic infrastructure has gone to an ambitious project to create over 140 kilometres of car tunnels (with a yet again historical allusion in the name, ‘Seven Hills Seven Tunnels’, 7 Tepe 7 Tünel), which will not alleviate the plight of average commuters, as only 15 percent of the city’s population own a car and few public buses operate in these new tunnels. For public transportation, a hastily erected bus rapid transit system (essentially a bus lane on the city highway) has been presented as the solution to all problems. Thus large-scale investments in the technical functioning of the global city contrast with rather symbolic solutions for the wider population. For an impression of the public discussion of these traffic projects, see http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=304820&page=4 and http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=427207&page=8 (accessed 12 January 2010).
37 Within four months it had been visited by 390,500 people; ‘Panoramik fetih müzesi rekor kıyrıor’, Millî Gazete, 30 May 2009, http://www.milligazete.com.tr/haber/panoramik-fetih-muzesi-rekor-kiriyor-127810.htm (accessed 6 January 2010). With ticket prices between 3 and 5 TL (roughly 1.5 and 2.5 euros), it is much more affordable than other museums in the city.
The museum combines a nationalist interpretation of the conquest with an Islamist one. While a film in infinite loop contextualizes it in the framework of nationalist Turkish victories within the confines of the present state from 1071 (Malazgirt), past 1915 (the Dardanelles) to 1922 (the so-called Turkish War of Independence), the explanatory texts portray Sultan Mehmed as acting on the command of the prophet.

Much more than the Tulip Period, the 'Conquest' has become a popular lieu de mémoire among the citizens of conservative to Islamist inclinations. It has replaced older founding myths of the city, if not of the nation, in popularity. For the annual commemoration on 29 May, which is celebrated in a stadium, spectators are bussed in from the far corners of the country.

The reactions of non-Islamist scholars to this cult and to the Conquest Museum in particular have varied from academic condescension to utter disgust. Critical historians have shown contempt for these interpretations, not only because of the lack of continuity of a Turkish 'nation' between 1071 and 1922 but also because the Islamist revisionists have chosen Mehmed II as their figurehead. According to critical interpretations the Conqueror was anything but pious in his lifestyle, policies or military decisions. But these critical interventions have not succeeded in diminishing a martial and Islamo-centric reinterpretation of Ottoman hegemony over Istanbul.

39 On the shoreline of Üsküdar, vis-à-vis the skyline of the historical districts, the municipality has erected oversized numerals, '1453' and '1923', in identical size and colour, depicting them as twin founding dates of the nation. '1453' has also become a popular T-shirt inscription.


41 Despite the religious ban on depicting living beings, he had his portrait painted by the Venetian artist Bellini; to repopulate Constantinople after the conquest, he did not hesitate to accommodate the surviving Christian population; on the other hand, when he ordered the storming of a Bosnian city that had surrendered and the Sheikh-ül Islam opposed him on dogmatic grounds, Mehmed had him removed from office. His decision to sack Constantinople seems not so much to have been inspired by the desire to subvert Christianity to Islam, but rather by an attempt to become a new Roman emperor, as his unsuccessful march on Rome testifies. Moreover, on medals he had commissioned by the Italian artists Gentile Bellini and Costanzo da Ferrara, the Latin inscriptions under Mehmed's portrait read 'imperatoris magni' and 'octhomani & bizantii imperatoris'. Kreiser, 'Sternstunden'; Mustafa Soykut, 'Mutual Perceptions of Europe and the Ottoman Empire in Its Classical Age', presentation at the conference on 'Maximilians Welt', Free University Berlin, 20 March 2009; medal depicted at http://www.ashmoleanprints.com/image.php?id=383197&idx=6&fromsearch=true (accessed 7 January 2010); Jürg Meyer zur Capellen, 'Gentile Bellini als Bildnismaler am Hofe Mehmelds II.', in Neslihan Asutay-Effenberger and Ulrich Rehm, eds., Sultan Mehmet II.: Eroberer Konstantinopels – Patron der Künste (Cologne: Böhlau, 2009), 139-160. This identification of Mehmed with the Greco-Roman tradition was partially accepted in the West, as a medal by Bertoldo di Giovanni shows, depicting the Sultan as an ancient Roman conquering emperor-god who held three maidens, shown to be Asia, Trapezunt and Greece, in captivity, while naked female bodies frame the scene; see Ulrich Rehm, 'Westliche Reaktionen auf die Eroberung Konstantinopels im Bild', in Sultan Mehmet II., op. cit., 161-176.
The Poli as cosmopolis: The city of Western order and multicultural harmony

'Bektashis, Europeans, Yezidis/ Armenians, Orthodox, Sunnites, Japanese/ Children of Istanbul, just like the colours of a rainbow;' Murat Ertel, 'İstanbul çocukları', performed by Baba Zula, Duble Oryantal, 2005.

In the nineteenth century, Ottoman society had decisively opened towards Western influences. As the European countries had grown in economic strength, military and political might, direct exchange with them grew to eclipse the previously important exchanges with Persia and Central Asia in the fields of fashion, education, trade, administration and technology. Especially the major port cities were transformed by these close relations that revolved around the steamship traffic. In Istanbul, the changes were most prominently reflected in the quarters of Galata and Pera (now referred to more commonly as Karaköy and Beyoğlu). Galata was the former Genoese city located directly across from old Constantinople on the northern shore of the Golden Horn with one of the largest ports in the vicinity, and the adjacent inland Pera was the seat of the foreign residences and embassies. While the former evolved into the city's business and finance district, the latter became an upper-class region and locale of department stores, cafés and theatres. Both districts saw a notable number of foreign Christian and Jewish immigrants from Russia, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Germany, the British Empire and France settle there, especially in the second half of the nineteenth century. With its modern housing built following mostly Parisian and Viennese examples, and ample job and business opportunities, many of the city's Christians and Jews relocated to the area and to the adjacent more affordable neighbourhoods. While Muslims were at all times present, they formed a minority both among the residential population and among the customers of the consumer and entertainment institutions. As no ethnic group formed a clear majority, though, contemporary observations and photography show a mix of Turkish, Greek, Armenian, Bulgarian, Judeo-Spanish, Italian, German and English in use, while French served as a semi-official lingua franca. With the official equality of all major religions in the empire after 1856, colossal Catholic, Greek Orthodox and Armenian churches as well as some Protestant churches and Jewish synagogues were built. In the attempt to establish Turkish cultural hegemony in the district, the Turkish Republic banned non-Turkish street and shop signs in the 1920s. Economic depression and periodic discriminatory legal and economic actions against minorities combined to drive away most non-Turks and non-Muslims from the area by the 1960s.

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42 'Bektashis, Europeans, Yezidis/ Armenians, Orthodox, Sunnites, Japanese/ Children of Istanbul, just like the colours of a rainbow;' Murat Ertel, 'İstanbul çocukları', performed by Baba Zula, Duble Oryantal, 2005.
From the 1980s onwards, Istanbullus participated in a global trend to rediscover the nineteenth-century city. Countless publications appeared, almost exclusively focusing on Galata-Pera, declaring it, because of its avowed Western glamour, a 'Little Paris of the Orient'. Often such descriptions end in a contrast with the present, scolding the city's inhabitants for having let this glamour decline.

Nostalgia for Pera fulfils several needs for a certain segment of Istanbul society. First, it sets a counter-model to other trajectories of urban development: it called for an end to the phase of 'urban anarchy', when small-scale investors, self-made businessmen and the urban poor had been able to change the city's texture almost at their leisure, but also stands against the ongoing megalomaniacal modernization of the city, calling for the preservation and restoration especially of its nineteenth-century architectural legacy. This counter-vision lies somewhere between the imagined small face-to-face community of the grassroots Islamist activists and unbridled global capitalism. It pleads for a well-managed city with amenities such as subways, public theatres, libraries, museums and for aesthetics of the public sphere that rehabilitate several elements of nineteenth-century urban planning, such as regularity, historicity and coherent vistas that can be enjoyed from a pedestrian's perspective. Second, the references to Pera evoke a formerly existing poly-ethnic society that managed to exist relatively peacefully despite its complexity, thus contradicting the prevalent Kemalist state ideology that domestic peace is necessarily based on the existence of only one legitimate ethnic culture in the public sphere. Third, the nostalgia derives from the Eurocentric world view of nineteenth-century Galata-Pera and expresses a need for a stronger European orientation in Turkey's present, especially in the fields of citizens' rights, democratic participation and public accountability. Fourth, deriving from the second and third points, it reflects a striving for a greater diversity of forms of articulation and experience, among others in gastronomy, the arts, theatre, nightlife and entertainment.

Nostalgia for Pera of the Belle Époque of the type described here is especially prevalent in a certain segment of Istanbul society that can by shorthand be described as the educated middle class, i.e. people of above-average education, versed in Western foreign languages and more likely to have had cultural experience with the world beyond the Turkish Republic. The social characteristics of this group are both its strength and its weakness. Thanks to their education, they occupy important positions in newspapers and other media, the Istanbul Chamber of Engineers, the Chamber of Architects, and in universities and are experienced and eloquent in making their voices heard in public. At the same time, their relatively small numbers make them irrelevant as a voter potential. Thus to make an impact on urban policy they need to appeal to a larger public and form alliances.

Two spheres can be differentiated where the image of the nineteenth-century Belle Époque city has played a significant role. They are, on the one hand, the architectural rehabilitation of Galata-Pera and its transformation into
an amusement centre; and, on the other, the resistance against modernization attempts that threaten the urban texture.

The nostalgia revolving around Pera and its nineteenth-century architectural and cultural legacy was quickly commodified. Countless cafés, taverns, restaurants, bars, clubs, cultural centres, and shops have crowded into the area, attracting numerous customers every night. These institutions have found it profitable to stress the multiethnic, multilingual makeup of the district in the past. Long-covered inscriptions, written in foreign and in the minorities' languages, have been restored and made prominently visible once more, such as a faded 'Papadakis' next to a Starbucks on İstiklal Caddesi, the 'Agoras Roumelias' and 'Cité de Roumelie' on the entrance to the Rumeli Carsısı passage, or Cité de Pera on what is now known as Çiçek Pasaji; an advertisement for 'Gabelfrühstück' outside a restaurant in Asmalı Mescid has been protected by plexiglass; and the restaurant Cezayır flaunts a plaque declaring the location the school of the Societa Operaia Italiana. For those who do not have such spectacular evidence of the past, nostalgic Greek or French names of the institutions must do. Architecturally many fin-de-siècle buildings have been restored in recent years, although the quality of these renovations has been the object of public criticism, as in the case of the former head post office, which was completely torn down except for its façade, while the investor was free to construct a modern building behind it. In many cases, buildings are completely torn down and rebuilt in supposedly identical shape. This provokes criticism that the result is nothing but a staging place for an artificial amusement park devoid of any authenticity. Nevertheless, Beyoğlu remains by far the most popular area for leisure activities in the city.

By contrast, nineteenth-century aesthetics have proven a powerful source of rhetoric to challenge the general direction of urban development and large-scale investors' plans in the wider city. To name just a few examples: when the turn-of-the-century Park Hotel in Gümüşsuyu, just a few metres off Taksim Square and İstiklal Caddesi, was torn down and construction was started for a skyscraper hotel that would have dominated the Bosporus skyline, a protest movement arose that managed to halt the construction. When a plan sprang up to redevelop the soon-to-be-closed shoreline Haydarpaşa railway yards and freight port into a locale for high-rise offices and a cruise marina, petitions and lawsuits managed to force the municipality into modifying its plans and adapting them more carefully to the surrounding sea- and landscape. The preparations for the construction of a third bridge and city highway across the Bosporus and through the Belgrade Forest face vociferous opposition by the Chamber of Architects, the Chamber of Engineers and a broad coalition in the media.

The counter-image that is constantly evoked in these protests is that of a tranquil city with great architectural sights that can be inspected in its entirety from
the deck of a Bosporus steamer.\textsuperscript{43} Protection of the city's waterfront panorama enjoys legal status since 1980. This vision stems from the mid-nineteenth century, when steamships first took up service to the suburbs along the Bosporus and the Sea of Marmara for the mostly middle- and upper-class commuters. Although the city has somewhat outgrown this vision, in particular since the post-World War II 'urban anarchy' phase, when nondescript industrial and residential zones sprang up far from the shore in regions such as Gaziosmanpaşa, Bağcılar, Ümraniye or Sultanbeyli, the educated middle class (and much of the rest of the population) did not adjust their mental map of the city, as these new districts lacked the embellishment, cultural legacy and natural beauty of the shorefront areas. Instead it is lamented that the residents of these districts, many of them recent migrants from Inner Anatolia, have never seen the sea.

Despite impressive successes, these campaigns for conservation of the city's seafront façade have also had to suffer several defeats, where capital interests or the obstinacy of municipal politicians won the upper hand. Thus the municipality insists on constructing an over-dimensioned suspension metro bridge over the Golden Horn between the Galata city walls and the surroundings of the Süleymaniye Mosque (with pillars originally planned to be 88 metres high, now after prolonged haggling with UNESCO downsized to around 47 metres), although this almost cost the city its World Heritage status. Of finished constructions, the most obvious eyesore for the skyline conservation movement is the Gökkafes skyscraper, now host to the Ritz-Carlton Hotel. Located in Maçka Valley in close vicinity to the Bosporus, it divides the former composite of the civil commercial architecture of Pera, the representative military barracks of Maçka Valley, and the model settlement of Teşvikiye to the other side. While at least further high-rises in the immediate vicinity of the sea have been prevented, the numerous skyscrapers located further inland because of their size now dwarf the historical city silhouette of mosques, palaces, embassies and civil architecture even from a distance.\textsuperscript{44}

Requiem for a republic: 'Istanbul, not Constantinople'

'Istanbul was Constantinople
Now it's Istanbul, not Constantinople
Why did Constantinople get the works?
That's nobody's business but the Turks'.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{43} As a prototypical example of this rhetoric, see İsmet Değirmenci, 'Suskun varpurları ya da siirini yitiren şehir', in \textit{Gaste} 111 (March 2008): 21.

\textsuperscript{44} I have elaborated on the 'European' legacy of Istanbul and its usage for the present in more detail in Fuhrmann, 'Vom stadtpolitischen Umgang'.

\textsuperscript{45} Jimmy Kennedy, 'Istanbul (Not Constantinople)', 1953.
The initial policy of the republic after 1923 towards Istanbul was one of neglect. Istanbul, it was believed, had failed to serve the interests of the emerging nation-state. It had not resisted Allied occupation, but had surrendered to the pressure of the victorious Western states to relinquish most of Anatolia. The moribund monarchy, the unpatriotic Westernized elites, the non-Muslims and the decadent elements of the city were not to take part in the establishment of the new, dynamic state. Accordingly the new capital was set up in the Anatolian heartland, attracting the lion's share of investment in urban planning, while Istanbul was initially left to fend for itself. Retrospectively this might even be seen as a spell of luck, as Istanbul was spared the overambitious architecture, urban re-planning and social engineering of the 1920s that Ankara, Izmir and also former-Ottoman Salonica in neighbouring Greece experienced.46

As a result of this official neglect, the 1920s can be seen as a period when Istanbullus created their own form of Kemalism from below. Adopting the new codes of conduct, dress rules, forms of socialization and of housing was on the agenda for a rising Muslim bourgeoisie in the city. One of the paradoxes of this national transformation was that it initially actually stimulated the interaction of Turks and non-Turks. Whereas in Ottoman times, Turks had often remained on the margins of the 'Frankish' culture of Pera, in the 1920s and after, they more readily engaged in sociabilities such as bars, dancing, hotels, the cinema and other places towards which mainstream Muslim society had previously had moral reservations. As non-Muslims continued to be prominently represented among the entrepreneurs and personnel of the entertainment sector, this inevitably brought Muslim customers to establishments run by non-Muslims.47 The same holds true for residential patterns: whereas in the imperial era, especially (but not only) Muslims had often preferred to live in single-family houses, seeing this as the proper way to preserve the decency of one's kin, living in a multiparty apartment house became a sign of distinction for the new pro-republican bourgeoisie of the city, which often entailed close contact with non-Muslim neighbours.

The initial interventions into the urban fabric to reshape it in the nation-state's image focused on renaming. The aim was to diminish the strong role non-Turkish inhabitants had played in the urban public and to let the Turkish-speaking part of the public feel 'at home' in all neighbourhoods. Foreign post services were


instructed that letters to 'Constantinople' would no longer be accepted, only to 'Istanbul'. The Grand rue de Pera/Cadde-i Kebir was renamed 'Independence Street' (İstiklal Caddesi), the predominantly non-Muslim neighbourhood Tatavla 'Liberation' (Kurtuluş) etc. The multilingual shop-signs, so common to late-imperial Istanbul, came to be frowned upon in the republic.

After an initial phase of reluctance, the political establishment in Ankara recognized that it could not simply content itself with putting up a few new street signs in the biggest, wealthiest and most renowned city in the country. The new ideals of the republic had to be inscribed into the urban sphere, by a visible and identifiable presence. In this effort, the republican establishment was careful to avoid any linkages with the Hamidian era, but built on the earlier reform attempts of the Tanzimat: just as during the reign of Abdülmecid and Abdülaziz, Maçka Valley became the nucleus of the state's presence in the city, extending to the avenue between Taksim and Teşvikiye on the ridge above it. However, it changed the spatial orderings of the Tanzimat to show that this state was different from its predecessor. While the president, just as Abdülmecid I, resided in Dolmabahçe Palace when present in the city, he made a point not to indulge in its luxury, but only to use a restricted segment for sleep and work. In the bottom of Maçka Valley, a large stadium was built in the location of the former imperial stables, demonstrating the new importance assigned to the physical condition of the citizen's body and its public display. Higher education also found its place in Maçka: two of the Tanzimat military barracks were turned over to the newly established Istanbul Technical University, while a third one was demolished to make way for the representative Taksim Square at the end of İstiklal Caddesi with its monument commemorating the founders of the republic. New buildings that sprang up in the vicinity included the Atatürk Cultural Centre, the Atatürk Library, the Istanbul Radio Broadcasting House, the (Lütfi Kirdar) Sports and Exhibition Hall and others.

The representative institutions that symbolized the state's patronizing of sports, higher education, research, the arts and general enlightenment were in the post-World War II turn of the Turkish Republic joined by signifiers of luxury and prestige. Following Turkey's 1952 accession to NATO, a number of international large-scale chain hotels were constructed between Taksim and Teşvikiye, of which the Hilton made the greatest impression on local society. Besides offering the city's elites the opportunity to indulge in the luxuries which were considered the benchmark of the Free World, these hotels were to represent the new international standing of the republic.

The present-day narrative about the public space by Istanbul adherents of the early republican past is inevitably one of loss. The lost political hegemony over the city (as mentioned above, pro-Islamic municipality majorities since the early 1990s) is seen as a backlash against the founding principles of the state. The changes brought on by the successive mayors are interpreted as initial steps of a reversion to monarchism and a theological order. Moreover, the former
elites, the pro-Kemalist middle class, find themselves marginalized in a city that caters to different tastes and pastimes (more modest dress and headscarves; an increasing dearth of licensed bars outside of Beyoğlu; the abovementioned Orientalist embellishment of the public space). The reaction, after an initial phase of attempting a counteroffensive to strengthen the Kemalist encodification of public space, has in recent times been predominantly defensive. In the initial phase, Beşiktaş, one of the last remaining inner-city districts with the Republican People's Party (CHP) in power, erected a 20-metre-high monument of metal and stone on the district's central square, which is a hub for public transport, major thoroughfare and popular shopping area. The monument created in 1999 includes a larger-than-life statue of Mustafa Kemal and a woman who personifies the nation and is officially called 'Democracy, Republic and the Principles of Atatürk'. It was intended as a reaction to the erosion of republican principles in what became an increasingly structural majority for pro-religious parties in Istanbul in the 1990s. But the sheer monumentality of the structure as well as its overburdening name betrays the anxiety of its founders: the monument overstates principles that according to the state ideology and myth should go without saying. Its style, reminiscent of late socialist political monuments, further lends the impression that the established champions of republican principles fail to communicate their convictions in a fashion that speaks to contemporary tastes. In more recent times, it seems that having surrendered their say in matters that affect the city as a whole, republicans will defend the spaces that form a part of the arrangement mentioned above, i.e. İstiklal Caddesi, Taksim Square and the adjacent institutions and quarters as well as the predominantly pro-republican residential areas, against reorderings that threaten to erase the Kemalist legacy in the city. A symptomatic example is the discussion about the reconstruction of the Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM) on Taksim.

Built in the realist style that has become so prominent because of its many examples in real socialist countries, the building hardly conforms to present-day popular architectural taste. On the initiative of Prime Minister Erdoğan, plans were drafted to replace the building by a new one. A wave of protest managed to halt these designs.

Ömer Kanıpak has criticized the champions of preservation for their innate conservatism. According to Kanıpak, they have canonized Kemalism into a new religion and have proclaimed the AKM its Kaaba, creating a myth out of a basically simple functionalist building. Focusing on form, they have forgotten to ponder the contents. The performances, plays and exhibitions staged there have long since stopped making an impression or provoking discussion in society at

large, but are bureaucratically, routinely executed.\footnote{Ömer Kanıpak, ‘Mimarlığın kutsallıkla mücadele’, \textit{Radikal}, 20 November 2009, 24.} A movement that set out to revolutionize society but today only defends its established institutions against change falls far short of leaving any serious imprint on the shaping of the city and its collective memory.

Nevertheless, a countermovement has started that reinterprets Kemalism for today's needs especially among youths who have lived under pro-Islamist Istanbul mayors for most of their lives. In their experience, Kemalism is not the dominant trope of the public sphere anymore, but a sub- or counterculture they identify with. They draw on it to resist the Islamist reorderings around them. In this way Kemalism in its new incarnation has become more of a grassroots movement than it ever was before. Expressions of this counterculture are internet discussion forums that concentrate on Mustafa Kemal's teachings or biography and, most visibly, his signature as a tattoo on forearms, thus taking up twenty-first-century electronic networking possibilities and fashions.\footnote{Özyürek, \textit{Nostalgia}, 84-90. For an example of a Kemalist discussion forum, see http://www.tatliaskim.com/mustafa-kemal-ataturk (accessed 9 June 2010).} The recent film \textit{Mustafa} has attempted to capture this desire to discover the republic's founder afresh.\footnote{As could be expected, 'Mustafa' was harshly criticized for transgressing against the official view of the state founder's life and works and provoked reactions in the form of two films following the orthodox interpretation of Mustafa Kemal's life.} However, the direction this popular reinterpretation will finally take has yet to be determined, and we have yet to see these neo-Kemalists find a common voice on the identity of Istanbul and how the city should develop.\footnote{A possible model could be the resistance against the Istanbul municipality's ban on alcoholic drinks at the popular restaurant on the ferry jetty of Moda. In 2008, every Friday evening at nine, young people would gather for a mass picnic with ostentatious public consumption of alcohol on the jetty outside the restaurant. While the Moda ferry jetty is a marked space of Kemalist modernity, the activists' rhetoric did not highlight this aspect, thus allowing for a broad coalition against the municipality's infringement on their lifestyle; 'Moda İskelesi için şerefe!', \textit{Cumhuriyet Dergi}, 31 August 2008, reproduced in http://www.alevihaberajansi.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5107&Itemid=9 (accessed 9 June 2010).}

\section*{Conclusion}

This chapter has brought together four popular visions of Istanbul's past that are quite different from one another, both in their contents and in their place in society. In the description, they are presented as more neatly distinct from each other than as they often appear in discourse. It seems the successful strategy of those dealing with the city's past is not to deny alternative historical narratives, but rather to dominate and to incorporate them into one's preferred vision of the past, the exception being \textit{Konstantinoupolis}.

As already mentioned, \textit{Konstantinoupolis}'s agency derives not from human interpretations but from its sheer material presence, blocking other visions or developments of the city. While this should not be underestimated, it does not
allow for the ancient city to inscribe itself onto the other visions. There are some signs, though, that this negation and commodification of Konstantinoupolis could change. During the city's status as European Capital of Cultures in 2010, the private Sakıp Sabancı Museum presented a large exhibition depicting the Bosporus and Golden Horn region from prehistoric to modern times. The main section focused on the city as capital of the Eastern Roman Empire. Rather than following narratives of 'decline' and 'conquest', the exhibition highlights the continuities from before to after 1453, exemplified by juxtaposing cupolas of pre-conquest churches with those of post-conquest mosques. Likewise, Mehmed II is neither demonized nor glorified, but depicted as a ruler who managed to communicate both Western and Eastern images of his empire. The narration portrays the city neither as Greek nor Turkish, but as the habitat of an ever-changing cosmopolitan population. But this authoritative and positive relation to Konstantinoupolis has so far remained academic, with little influence on popular opinion.53

In reverse, this massive material legacy can be integrated into the vision of a proud Ottoman city. Çağlar Keyder has declared Islambol the winner in Istanbul's quest for identity.54 Not the radical, ahistorical Islamic city, but a post-modern megalopolis that has re-adorned itself with the Ottoman dynasty's emblem is the vision that has rallied the greatest amount of support around it. One of the strengths of this version of the city's history derives from political constellations. Prime Minister Erdoğan, having formerly served as mayor, is reputed to still have a keen interest in the city's affairs, taking major decisions personally.55 The central government has high hopes for the city's potential to attract tourism and foreign capital and in consequence, the city enjoys a high degree of central-government investments. The official AKP mayor Kadir Topbaş enjoys a comfortable majority in the municipality.

The other element is, however, the attractiveness and flexibility of the vision itself. Those who would like to see a more militant version of Islam prevail can symbolically participate in it by visiting the Conquest Museum and revel in the glory of past military victories. The East Roman legacy is highlighted in this context to show the immense feat that Mehmed II accomplished by conquering the city. Incidentally, we are instructed to interpret his fixation on East Roman and Italian culture not as disdain for Islamic culture and dogma, but as the magnanimous attitude of a farsighted leader.56

The Conquest Museum is not, however, pointed out to foreign visitors, nor are there any English translations of the explanatory texts. Towards visitors of

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53 Sakıp Sabancı Museum, 'Efsane İstanbul: Bizantion'dan İstanbul'a - Bir Başkentin 8000 Yılı', exhibition 5 June – 4 September 2010.
54 Çağlar Keyder, 'Metropolis Istanbul: Global Hype, Local Realities', paper presented at the conference on 'Istanbul 2010: Stadt(t)räume, Stadtgegensätze', Free University Berlin, 4 December 2009.
55 Ibid.
56 Fetih Müzesi, permanent exhibition.
Christian or Jewish background, the city is portrayed as one of intercultural and interreligious tolerance. In this context the fact that many pre-conquest churches remained intact and their paintings and mosaics could be rediscovered in recent centuries is shown as further proof of the magnanimous order of the Sultans. This so-called moderate Islam works both ways in tourism: it aims to attract both Western tourists who might be reluctant to visit Islamic countries of more conservative reputation and tourists from the Persian Gulf states and Iran who are eager to take a vacation from their home countries' more moralist public order, but fear the visa and security harassment and Islamophobia of the West.

The incorporation of the educated middle class and their vision of a cosmopolitan Poli based on nineteenth-century Pera into the Islambol vision of the city follows the same approach: the cosmopolitan condition of the city was only made possible by the magnanimous attitude of the Sultans. Trying to step into the Sultans' footsteps, the district mayor of Beyoğlu, the Istanbul Greater Municipality mayor and the prime minister have repeatedly invited the Greek Orthodox patriarch, the Armenian archbishop and the Grand Rabbi for a common dinner or iftar (breaking of the Ramadan fast), to enact interreligious harmony in front of TV cameras.57

The attitude towards Beyoğlu in general, which has become a centre and refuge for behaviour that has become unacceptable in much of the city, such as excess, public consumption of alcohol, casual contact with the other sex, homosexuality and gender transgressions, is similar as towards the Christians and Jews. While the religious minorities are treated as millets, as communities which are expected to respect the authorities, but are tolerated to live their private life to a certain degree in difference to mainstream society, Beyoğlu is once again treated as a Frenk Mahallesi, a gathering place for gâvurs (infidels). As a global city, Istanbul aims not only to attract multinational investments but also foreign experts, who will be reluctant to settle in the city if the amenities do not exceed the rather sterile entertainment possibilities of Riyadh or Teheran. The fact that these amenities are concentrated in a region that can lay claim to an authentic history as a Europeanized quarter and that it is also host to a lively domestic art, music and nightlife scene are assets in making Beyoğlu attractive for expatriate white-collar workers. As long as the transgressions are restricted to the quarter, there is little fear of them spilling over and disrupting the life of the model citizen of Islambol, whose life revolves around work, the family, pious rituals and the grandeur of the Ottoman past.

57 However, like the Sultans of old the AKP establishment believes that their relative religious tolerance should be passively and gratefully accepted. A genuinely liberal attitude towards minority religions, let alone accepting freedom of religion as an inalienable right, is not on the agenda. This approach naturally creates frictions. When the patriarch Bartholomew spoke frankly about the limits of Christian freedom of religion in Turkey, he was subjected to harsh critique, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uAhNzusURQs (accessed 15 January 2010).
With regard to the republican legacy of the city, the adherents of Islambol have so far exercised restraint. They have renovated the Atatürk Library and the Republic Monument. The price, as mentioned before, is that Kemalism has become a defensive strategy to defend established sites of the republic in the city rather than offer alternative visions for the future. However, stronger interventions into the Kemalist Taksim-Teşvikiye axis are under preparation. While constructing a mosque on Taksim Square is still on the agenda, the new plans for Taksim Square focus on the destruction of Gezi Park and the construction of a shopping mall in its place. The mall's façade with onion domes, arches and décor will mimic the late-Ottoman Artillery Barracks that had been demolished in 1940 to make way for the park. If the plans for the mall are implemented, this building will best epitomize the present government's strategy towards Istanbul's pasts: at the core is the erection of the typical infrastructure of twenty-first-century global modernity, i.e. airports, highways, office towers and indistinguishable retailer franchises; only the auto-Orientalist façade reminds the viewer of the imperial days of glory.

When considering how the adherents of the cosmopolitan Poli have related to other visions of the city, the assessment is rather complex. While in other cities such as Izmir (still controlled by the CHP), a large part of the city's establishment from the municipality to the Chamber of Commerce have readily made recourse to the splendours of the city of the nineteenth century and declared it a goal to emulate for the future (partially because Izmir's republican history is rather bleak), the champions of the cosmopolitan Istanbul of the late nineteenth century have been rather timid to explicitly set it up as a counter-model to the past. Many elements of their discourse reveal their origin in the bourgeois outlook on the urban sphere typical of the Belle Époque – appeals to the responsible citizen, demands for accountable urban governance, regularity of the street grid, an aesthetically pleasing public space that can be enjoyed on foot, the importance of panoramic vistas and especially of incorporating the waterfront into the city proper. However, when it comes to public debates about the restructuring of the city, these elements will often be referred to as aspects of a republican Istanbul. The cherished ease of pondering the city's skyline – unspoiled by skyscrapers and bridges – from the deck of a local ferry is not marked out as having been introduced into the city in the age of the reformist, pro-European Sultans; nor are the electric trams usually associated with that era, but instead nostalgic photographs and accounts will depict them in the early republican period. The endangered 1908 Haydarpaşa Train Station is referred to as 'the first railway

59 Fuhrmann, ‘Vom stadtpolitischen Umgang’.
yard of our country', a historically absurd statement.⁶⁰ Even the defence of Pera/Beşiktaş as a multicultural space more often makes explicit reference to the period of the early republic, when Turks appropriated this space, than to the period when the region had not yet been subjected to the hegemony of a mono-ethnic nation-state.⁶¹

The reason for this masquerading behind the façade of the republic is the necessity of alliances. Because of the relatively small number of present-day adherents of a cosmopolitan Poli and their lack of an official voice in party politics, they turn to the segment of society with republican ideals for support. Despite the opposition between nationalist and cosmopolitan ideals, both sides find themselves united through the common orientation towards European norms of sociability and distinction: drinking raki, beer or wine instead of tea on a night out; promoting exposure rather than seclusion of women; interest in opera, modern art or modern music as opposed to traditional or popular forms of arts and entertainment. Thus polemics which implicitly evoke the good old days before 1922 will avoid any references that could be misunderstood as nostalgia for the days of the Sultans, and will often make explicit statements using a national 'we' in the hope of winning allies. However, the fusion of the two theoretically competing historical visions of the Poli and Istanbul, not Constantinople has so far not managed to create a surplus in the number of citizens who feel this fused vision to give voice to their experience of the city. Instead, it acts rather as an implosion of the two discourses onto another, limiting the scope of counter-narratives that can be mobilized in opposition to the neo-liberalism and auto-Orientalism that dominate the public sphere at present.

With the political majorities and cultural sentiments as they are at the moment, it seems the combination of radical modernization and nostalgia for the monarchy will continue to set the pace for the Istanbulites' image of their city's past, while republicans and cosmopolitans can at best defend certain reservations—

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⁶⁰ Oktay Ekinci, ‘Ülkenin ilk demiryolu alanı olduğu için ,tarihsel sit alanı' sayılacak Haydarpaşa'yı ,kurtarma' karar', Cumhuriyet, 1 May 2006. The statement is not only absurd because the first railway within the confines of present-day Turkey started operating half a century earlier between Izmir and Aydın, but also because Haydarpaşa in its founding days was hardly Turkish: built by a company of which the seat was Switzerland, the majority of the shares were owned by Germans and a minority by Frenchmen, the directorate was occupied by Swiss and Germans, and the labour force was German, Austrian, Italian, Greek, Armenian, Turkish etc. The Anatolian Railway Company was as multinational as contemporary Pera.

the Frankish Quarter here, the Taksim-Teşvikiye axis there – as monuments to the model of urbanity they would have preferred to spread over the city. Nevertheless, Istanbul's long history shows that it has hardly ever been possible to reorder the entire city's memory into a teleologic, uncontradictory narrative: too many traces of different pasts remain, too diverse are the inhabitants' experiences of the city and its various legacies.
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