Muslim Youths in Germany and the Question of Israel-Directed Antisemitism: The Developmental and Discursive Context of a Phenomenon

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**Introduction**

The article inquires into how (some) German Muslim youths come to position themselves against the State of Israel today and how this positioning is both linked to and distinct from the category of “Muslim antisemitism.” Because of the changing demographic character of Germany, in 2010 there were about four million Muslims – representing approximately 5% of the population – in Germany. Contemporary media and policy in Germany identify antisemitic attitudes among Muslim immigrant communities as a central concern of policy and educational practice (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2008).

In the article I address this concern and propose that in order to grasp conceptually the phenomenon of the positioning of (some) youths from German Muslim communities against the State of Israel, we require categories that expand current ethnocultural and religious conceptualizations of “Muslim antisemitism.” I argue that Muslim antisemitism and anti-Israeli positioning of youths from German Muslim communities are related, but distinct phenomena, and that in order to understand their relationship we need to understand their conditions of possibility – both chronologically and causally. In the paper I will outline the complex discursive and social processes that frame the anti-Israeli positioning of (some) German Muslim youths. I will argue that in Germany hegemonic antisemitic discourse (“Israelkritik”) and a concurrent strand of anti-Muslim racist discourse serve as a conceptual and ideological framework that provides the conditions of possibility for Muslim youths’ positioning against the State of Israel and its (Jewish) citizens. I will discuss as preconditions for the anti-Israeli positioning among (some) Muslim youths, first, the preexisting blueprint of German “Israelkritik” and anti-Muslim discourse that positions Muslim youths in an antagonistic relationship with the State of Israel and Jews more generally, and, second, the production of a large societal group of disenfranchised and stigmatized Muslim youths in Germany who develop a heightened need for alternative socio-emotional identities such as politicized counter-identities as Muslims. I attempt to show that youths who develop politicized counter-identities as Muslims embrace a particular set of discursive ascriptions in terms of

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their positioning vis-à-vis the State of Israel. I will thus theorize anti-Israeli-positioning as a nexus linking youths’ discursive ascription as “Muslim” in contemporary Germany and the development of politicized identities. The central point made here is that the genesis of youths' anti-Israeli positioning is distinct from more simple narratives about the ethnocultural transmission of “Muslim antisemitism” in Muslim immigrant families, or a secondary antisemitism of Muslim youths in Germany that is seen as rooted in their naturalized positioning in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I thereby hope to complicate and perturb the often reified relationship between Muslim German youths and the State of Israel and its citizens.

The paper has been divided into three parts. I first outline the findings of qualitative and quantitative research on antisemitic attitudes among Muslim Germans and in the general population of Germany. I evaluate the major approaches to understanding antisemitic attitudes among Muslim youths (e.g., ethnocultural background, Muslim religious membership, and politicized identities as Muslims) in light of the existing literature. Second, I introduce the experiences of German Muslim youths in the context of the discursive construction of “Muslims” in Germany in the post-9/11 era. I here draw on a synthesis of developmental, anthropological, and sociological perspectives that foreground minoritized and marginalized youths’ responses to their discursive positioning, stigmatization, and exclusion in contemporary Western society and connect these to the development of politicized identities as “Muslims”. In closing, I, thirdly, discuss how anti-Israeli positioning and antisemitism of (some) German Muslim youths are then distinct phenomena – even asat the same time they are intimately connected to each other. Given the redefined problem, I in the addendum assess educational openings for responding to the problem of anti-Israeli positioning among German Muslim youths.
Chapter I: “Israelkritik” and Antisemitism in Germany

What are the hard facts on the form, function, and distribution of antisemitism in Germany? Antisemitic attitudes are a persistent problem in all strata and among all groups of German society and in Europe more generally (Zick and Küpper 2011). In 2010, every sixth German agreed with the statement “Jews have too much influence in Germany.” While such responses reflect traditional antisemitic attitudes, the phenomenon of antisemitism in Germany is not monolithic and unchanging. The changing form and function of antisemitism in Germany today is most clearly manifested in the phenomenon of “new” or “secondary” antisemitism (Rabinowitz et al. 2004). The term secondary antisemitism describes phenomena that result from the need to deflect guilt after the Shoah (Leibold and Künnel 2009) and that are also described by the formula “antisemitism because of Auschwitz.”

The main topoi include blaming the victims and claiming a shared responsibility of Jews for their persecution in the Shoah, the attempt to reverse victim-perpetrator roles, demands to end the ongoing critical and self-reflexive engagement with the Shoah in Germany, and the claim that commemorating the Holocaust serves as a means to extract financial retributions from Germany. One variation of secondary antisemitism that is of central concern for this paper is the demonization and delegitimization of the State of Israel and its (Jewish) citizens (Porat 2011; Sharansky 2004).

“Israelkritik,” or criticism of Israel, is an established political term in Germany and has been defined as one-sided and harsh critique of the State of Israel – both by right- and left-wing commentators. This contemporary critique, conveyed in secondary antisemitic thinking, draws on and feeds off anti-Jewish attitudes and myths of traditional antisemitism (Heyder et al. 2005). The main lines of “critique” today are characterized by demonization, double standards, and delegitimization. Demonization refers to the comparison of Israel with Nazi Germany and a collective blaming of all (Jewish) Israeli citizens as responsible for Israeli state actions deemed “fascist.” Double standards are in place when human rights infractions are criticized if

1 The term “new antisemitism” that has been in use since the turn of the century has been rejected in the academic debate. The seemingly “new” elements – both the focus on Israel and on Muslims as antisemitic agents – upon scrutinization simply represent the continuation of well-known phenomena (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2011).

2 Referring to the often-cited phrase by the Israeli psychoanalyst Zvi Rex, “The Germans will never forgive us the Holocaust” (cited in Henryk M. Broder, Die Vordenker als Wegdenker, in: Otto R. Romberg and Susanne Urban-Fahr (Hg), Juden in Deutschland nach 1945, Bonn (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung) 2000, S. 89.
they are committed by Israeli state forces, but not if they are committed by the forces of other states. The outrage about human rights violations by the State of Israel is indicative of double standards in the judgment of Israel and of other states. Delegitimization questions the right of the State of Israel to exist by demeaning it as a leftover of colonialism and negating its right to exist on the basis of its “non-democratic” and “racist” citizenship law and its having been founded on the expulsion of the Palestinian Arab population in 1948. Direct and indirect comparisons are used to liken the Israeli political situation to the systems of South African Apartheid and Nazi Germany.

Such “3-D” argumentation patterns can today be found in the German mainstream media of both the right and left. For example, chief columnist Werner Pirker of the leftist daily Junge Welt (Young World) refers to a “State of Apartheid” (“Apartheids-Staat”), an “artificially inseminated state” (“Staat aus der Retorte”), which is the result of an “unparalleled ethnic cleaning process” (“Ergebnis eines ethnischen Säuberungsprozesses, der seinesgleichen sucht”) (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2011). These positions show clear connections to antisemitic discourses: Israel as an artificial state without a right to exist, which is built on the historical foundations of genocide and racism. Especially the last aspect invokes an indirect parallelism to Germany during the Nazi era. Such statements then demonize Israel as a criminal and immoral state, while the discursive content at the same time relativizes the crimes of Nazi Germany and reverses perpetrator-victim positions (Faber et al. 2006). At the center of a heated public debate in Germany today is the “right to critique” the State of Israel. The differentiation of this allegedly “legitimate” critique of Israel from (secondary) antisemitic incitement is intensely contested. Antisemitism research shows that, contrary to their claims, the vast majority of those who critique Israel also agree with statements that are antisemitic.3 Despite the claims of invested parties to the contrary, a critique of Israel that does not carry antisemitic connotations has been shown to be “possible, but rare” (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung 2012).

3 In its 2004 survey on group-focused enmity (GBM), the Bielefeld Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence found that only 10% of respondents who communicated a critique of Israel without antisemitic overtones did also not agree with at least one other antisemitic statement (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung 2012). The majority of this minority of respondents also criticized the Palestinian attacks on Israel and were against violence as a means of conflict resolution. Their political positioning was more “left” than “center,” they had higher educational status than average, were less nationalist and authoritarian, and more tolerant of other groups (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung 2012).
Recent empirical studies have shown that antisemitic attitudes in Germany’s general population are now in fact primarily communicated via a critique of Israel’s actions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. A recent representative study showed that 32%-68% of the general population in Germany reported antisemitic stereotypes that are legitimized via a critique of Israeli state policies (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007; Heitmeyer 2005). More than a third of respondents “understand that people don’t like Jews” in light of the “political actions of the State of Israel,” thereby projecting their criticism of the Israeli state onto “the Jews” in general. More than 40% agree that Israeli policies towards the Palestinians can be compared with the persecution of Jews during National Socialism in Germany. Seventy percent of German respondents think Israel is presently the greatest threat to world peace (Riebe 2012). More than half agree with the statement that Israel is conducting a “war of annihilation” against the Palestinians. What the available survey data suggests then is that secondary antisemitism, legitimized via a critique of the State of Israel, is widespread among the German population and forms the fabric of contemporary public thought and discourse on the topic (Bunzl and Senfft 2008; Bunzl 2005; Silverstein 2008; Volkov 1978).

Deconstructing “Muslim Antisemitism”

While secondary, Israel-directed antisemitic discourse is then widespread in Germany overall, the contemporary public discussion is particularly concerned with one particular strand of antisemitism: “Muslim antisemitism” (Müller 2007a; Stender 2010; Stender and Follert 2010; Widmann 2008). Both media and policy discourse in Germany today identify specifically “Muslim antisemitism,” i.e., antisemitic attitudes among Muslim immigrant communities, as an urgent problem and a central concern of policy and educational practice (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung 2008). Although immigrants and citizens whose parents or grandparents have immigrated to Germany were not the focus of the public and academic discussion about antisemitism in Germany prior to 2002-2003 (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2011), current public discourse identifies “immigrants” (“Ausländer”), “Muslims with immigrant background” (“Muslime mit Migrationshintergrund”), and simply “the Muslims”

While as of today no final term to describe the phenomenon of antisemitism among Muslims has been agreed on (Jikeli 2010: 18f.), this paper employs the term “Muslim antisemitism.” For the purpose of this paper the term “Muslim antisemitism” is used primarily as a discursive trope.
Today both public discourse and research addressing the phenomenon of antisemitism among Muslims in Germany primarily draw on “cultural explanations” that foreground the transmission of antisemitic attitudes as part and parcel of traditional ethnocultural values and religious beliefs in Muslim immigrant families (Stender and Follert 2010; Widmann 2008). The literature employs terms such as “Islamic,” “Islamist,” “Islamized,” “Arab,” or “Arab-Islamic” antisemitism which denote different historical developments that have led to the emergence of antisemitism in different places and among different populations. As a case in point, Islamic, Islamist, Arab, or Arab-Islamic antisemitism all are ethno-religious concepts (Jikeli 2010; Jikeli 2012; Kiefer 2007; Wentzel 2005).

A second strand sees antisemitism among Muslims in Germany as a result of the personal – though vicarious – experience of victimization in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (AMIRA 2008; Arnold and Jikeli 2008; Faber et al. 2006; Messerschmidt 2006). Accumulating discourses feed on tragic incidents such as those in which young “Muslim” men physically attacked Jewish men identified by wearing kipas in the streets of Berlin. Highly mediated political spectacles such as Al-Quds Day demonstrations further showcase the public imagery of groups of angry young men from Muslim communities who participate in protests against the State of Israel while shouting antisemitic and anti-Israeli slogans. While these events represent the views of a small percentage of Muslims in Berlin and in Germany overall (see the next section), they have come to be emblematic of the phenomenon of “Muslim antisemitism” discursively ascribed to the larger collective of Muslims in Germany. Muslim youths, especially from Arab families, are discursively positioned as second-degree victims who respond to a conflict that is thought to affect their close or distant families, or their ethno-religious networks via the larger Muslim collectivity. The emblematic behaviors of outrage against Israel are portrayed as emotional responses of Muslim youth of different national backgrounds (including Turkish youths who have no personal ties to the region) towards the feeling of shared victimization of “Muslims” by the State of Israel’s actions against the population of the Palestinian Territories (AMIRA 2008; Bundesministerium des Inneren 2011).

Thus the phenomenon of “Muslim antisemitism,” as publicly discussed in Germany at present, represents a curious mutant: It is thought of as both a cultural
form of antisemitism that is passed down in families as part of a larger package of “Muslim” cultural values and religious beliefs, and as a contemporary form of antisemitism that is directed at the State of Israel and its actions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As such, the typecasting of this facet of antisemitism represents a distinct hybrid of cultural-religious “Islamic antisemitism” and the “secondary antisemitism” of mainstream society in Germany.

Despite policy and discourse, reliable empirical studies on the attitudes of immigrants from Muslim communities, and their descendants, that would corroborate this discourse are only incipient (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2011). While the focus of current policy is on Muslims, and in particular Muslim youths, as primary carriers of antisemitism, a recent representative study reported that antisemitic attitudes present a problem in all strata of German society: 32%-68% of the general population reported antisemitic stereotypes that are legitimized via a critique of Israeli state policies (Heitmeyer 2005). In light of these findings, critics of the debate on “Muslim antisemitism” refer to a displacement of antisemitism onto the minority group of Muslims, which fits well into the general context of a societal mood that has been described as “Islamophobic” or “anti-Muslim” (Messerschmidt 2006), and it has been suggested that the focus on “Muslim antisemitism” in Germany fulfills a placeholder function that allows a suppression of a societal discussion about the antisemitism of autochthonous Germans. Thus the focus of the public debate about antisemitism on the population of Muslim youth in Germany opens up a series of questions.

Incomplete Answers: A Synthesis

Despite the subject’s ubiquitousness in the public discussion, there is still a dearth of data on the actual characteristics and distributions of antisemitic beliefs among Muslim youth in Germany. Two recent representative studies presenting reliable survey data on this question showed that 25.7% of Muslims under the age of 25 agreed that “people of Jewish belief are arrogant and greedy” (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007), and that 26% of Muslims under the age of 25 reported antisemitic stereotypes that are legitimized via a critique of Israeli state policies (Heitmeyer, 2005). Other studies reported different results. The Pew Global Attitudes Project reported findings on a one-item question measuring antisemitic attitudes, with which 22% of the
general population and 44% of Muslims in Germany agreed (Kohut et al. 2006). Two other studies also reported that Muslim youths in Germany also showed higher levels of antisemitic attitudes than non-Muslim German youths, though the detailed analysis showed that the subfacets of antisemitic attitudes varied among subgroups of Muslims defined by citizenship, ethnicity, fundamentalist and religious orientation (Mansel and Spaiser 2010; Frindte et al. 2012).

Apart from these few surveys, most of the recent literature on the attitudes and antisemitic beliefs of Muslim-oriented youths in Germany is based on qualitative studies conducted with small samples of youths (typically around 10-30 participants) who were non-randomly selected. These studies can be fruitfully employed to identify patterns of beliefs and reasoning among those youths who ended up self-selecting into these studies. They do not represent, however, the attitudes of “average” youths with similar backgrounds as these kinds of claims cannot be made based on non-representative samples of such a small size. This caveat is very important when considering the results reported in a series of qualitative studies conducted in recent years, for which clarifying antisemitic attitudes and belief systems was the explicit objective. These studies report on what they set out to find, and they often do so in a differentiated and informative way. However, even though they are unfortunately at times interpreted this way, they cannot be taken to present a snapshot of how “average” Muslim-oriented youths in Germany’s centers today think or act.

**It’s Not Ethnocultural Background**

Related to this methodological caveat, the findings of available qualitative research on antisemitism among German Muslim youths are at present strongly contradictory; a meta-analysis of their findings suggests that a single ethnocultural bias is most likely not the causal factor for antisemitic attitudes among German Muslim youths. When comparing antisemitic argumentation patterns among Muslim youths in Berlin, Paris, and London, one study found that antisemitic attitudes could be found among the majority of the 37 youths in Berlin-Kreuzberg and Neukölln. However, these attitudes were varied and at times contradicted themselves. Many of the interviewees reported

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5 The survey item asked Muslims and non-Muslims whether they had a “favorable or unfavorable opinion of Jews.” Since the one-item measure has very low reliability, the finding may primarily be interpreted as indicating that among respondents, Muslim respondents had less of a taboo to admit antisemitic attitudes than non-Muslims.
traditional antisemitic stereotypes, conspiracy theories (such as claims of the strong influence of Jews in the media, which referred to the media coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the negative representation of Muslims in the global press [Jikeli 2010b: 16f.]), and a general rejection of Jews. They also reported positive stereotypes about Jews such as their alleged intelligence or strong loyalty among themselves (Jikeli 2010a, 2010b).

Another recent study showed that while talk about “Jews” among students who are ethnically German immigrants from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (“Spätaussiedler”) and students with Turkish or Arab background (Stender and Follert 2010) was characterized by traditional antisemitic stereotypes, most of the youths from these groups had only partial and fragmented knowledge of these stereotypes and did not exhibit a manifest antisemitic worldview. In contrast to public discourse, Turkish and Arab German students in this study did not report open and “brutal” antisemitic stereotypes, while ethnically German students born to families from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe did (Stender and Follert 2010: 201). Yet another study similarly found that traditional antisemitic stereotypes were almost unknown and consisted primarily of the stereotype of the “rich” or “business-minded Jew” (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007). In a related vein, while at least one study describes an “antisemitic norm” in the social networks of Muslim youths which enabled a normalization of antisemitic attitudes along with an increased probability to act on these attitudes (Jikeli 2010a), other studies have found the opposite, such as an internalization of the societal taboo of antisemitic thought among youths from established immigrant communities, such as Turkish Germans (Stender et al. 2010).

These contradictory findings suggest that the assumed transmission of antisemitic stereotypes and attitudes via ethnocultural “Muslim” group membership as a primary process pathway is currently not clearly supported by the empirical evidence. German Muslim youths show a variety of responses in these studies ranging from engagement to disinterest. The available survey evidence from representative studies points to other possible factors that may nurture the emergence of such attitudes. These studies show that an increase in antisemitic attitudes is generally associated with lower educational background, fear of social derailment, as well as Muslim and Christian religious orientation (as opposed to religious membership), and religio-political

6 Religious orientation is distinct from religious group membership. As such, this finding does not
It’s Not Religious Membership, but Fundamentalist-Religious Orientation
Several studies engage the question of whether antisemitic attitudes among Muslim-oriented youths are a phenomenon of religious orientation (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2011: 78). Several studies have found that Islam is reported to have high importance for most youths, irrespective of – and often in contrast to – their everyday religious practice. Alevi, a particularly liberal branch of Islam, represent 13%-25% of the Muslim population in Germany. On the other end of the spectrum, the group of fundamentalist Muslim youths represents about 20% of the larger Muslim population in Germany, as found by a recent survey among young Muslims between the ages of 14 and 32 which identified a subgroup of about 20% which was “highly religious with strong antipathy against the West, a tendency to accept violence, and without intention to integrate into German society” (Frindte et al. 2012).7 The majority of Muslim youths, however, appear to choose “light” versions of Islamic identities, which include more liberal streams of Islam and the “young, chic and cool” hybrid of “Pop-Islam” (AlSayyad and Castells 2002; Frindte et al. 2012; Gerlach 2006).

A qualitative study investigating how antisemitic argumentation patterns may be related to Muslim cultural identity found that some of German Muslim youths assumed a generalized enmity to exist between Muslims and Jews which they attempted to explain by recourse to the history of Islam. A stereotype of “the Jew” as traitor was linked to the alleged betrayal of Mohammed by “the Jews” or legends of Jews who “during Islamic times” had posed as Muslims in order to derail other Muslims from their religious path (Arnold and Jikeli 2008).

However, stronger evidence emerges from a representative survey which found that traditional antisemitic stereotypes seem to be most explicitly linked to a fundamentalist religious orientation (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007: 275). Some 15.7% of fundamentalist-religious Muslim youths enrolled in grades 9 and 10 agreed with the statement that “people of the Jewish faith are arrogant and greedy,” while among

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7 Fifteen percent of Muslims with German citizenship (presumably second- and third-generation immigrants as well as converts to Islam) and 24% of Muslims with non-German citizenship (presumably first-generation immigrants) agreed with this statement.
those who were only “lightly” religious only 3% agreed with this statement. While research on the small group of followers of radical Islam has shown that these followers make strong recourse to the reasoning of Islamic antisemitism (Bostom 2008; Müller 2007b), this is not the case for the majority of “lightly religious” second- and third-generation immigrant youths from Muslim communities in Germany. In sum, while fundamentalist orientation does imply a stronger tendency towards antisemitic attitudes, Muslim religious membership per se does not.

The findings from both surveys and qualitative research shows that youths from Muslim communities hold and express antisemitic beliefs to differing degrees and with different ideologies of legitimization. This indicates that there is no simple association between Muslim ethnocultural or religious group membership (as distinct from fundamentalist religious orientation of both Muslims and Christians) and the development of antisemitic attitudes.

**Politicized Identities and Anti-Israeli Positioning**

Several applied educational interventions have repeatedly found that enmity against Israel is an important trope among the youths, while religious antisemitism seems to play only a small role (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung 2012; Müller 2009; AMIRA 2008). The enmity against Israel has been described by educators and practitioners as a means of solidarity among immigrant youths in Germany who hitherto had been in conflictual relationships with each other, such as Turkish and Arab German youths in inner-city neighborhoods of Berlin (AMIRA 2008). That the expression of antisemitic stereotypes may function as a source of shared identity and solidarity – rather rather than being rooted in a traditional antisemitic worldview – has been corroborated by qualitative (KIGA 2006; Bundesministerium des Inneren 2011: 83) and quantitative studies (Scherr and Schäuble 2007). In that vein, two recent studies reported that antisemitic beliefs were often expressed in relation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in which Israelis and Jews were equated with murderers (Mansel and Spaiser 2010; Arnold and Jikeli 2008). Arnold and Jikeli also reported that especially among youths from Turkish families there often was very little interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while they found antisemitic attitudes to be more common among youths who self-identified as Arab or Palestinian (Arnold and Jikeli 2008). A recent large-

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8 Only 7.4% of other immigrant youths (non-Muslim) and 5.7% of non-Muslim autochthonous Germans agreed with this statement.
scale study finally demonstrated that a strong rejection and feelings of enmity against Jews existed only if youths (with immigrant backgrounds) defined themselves as “Muslims” politically, which entailed that they assumed a fundamental global-political conflict between “the West” and the “Muslim world.”

These findings provide mounting evidence that expressions of antisemitism among Muslim-oriented youths in Germany are often closely linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constellation. The findings suggest that among many German Muslim youths, antisemitism is characterized not so much by traditional antisemitic stereotypes (that would indicate “culturally transmitted” Muslim antisemitism), but rather by one-sided critiques of Israel that may make recourse to antisemitic discourse. The actual spread and distribution of these Israel-directed negative attitudes among Muslim youths in Germany is, however, not known at this point.

In order to advance our analysis, it is important to foreground the contradictory results reported by the empirical studies noted above and to see them as indicative of the possibility that the low reliability of the findings of qualitative studies which employ the construct of antisemitism among Muslim-oriented youths in Germany as rooted in Muslim ethnocultural or religious membership is due to the fact that it has low explanatory power in this particular case. Quantitative studies which found that processes of social derailment and lower educational background are strongly associated with antisemitic attitudes indicate that there seem to be two main process pathways that are important contributing factors for antisemitic attitudes among all social groups in Germany, including Muslims: first, fundamentalist-religious orientation, and second, experiences of social exclusion and marginalization. The latter facet appears to (in some instances) additionally draw on patterns and tropes of the former (why and how is understudied so far). Yet the quantitative findings indicate that these appear to be distinct processes. Because a range of studies have already considered “cultural” and religious explanations for the anti-Israeli positioning of Muslim youths, this paper will take the road less traveled and examine experiences of marginalization specific to the German context as conditions of possibility for the development of Israel-directed positioning among Muslim youths in Germany.

In the next section I will thus explore the conundrum of how (some) German Muslims youth – including those from communities that have historically not been in a conflictual relationship with Israel, such as Turkish immigrants – find themselves
positioned as (political) antagonists to the State of Israel. I will outline the coalescence of anti-Muslim discourse in Germany that entails disintegrative experiences for German Muslim youths with reifying discourses about an antagonistic relationship between “Arabs” and Jews that is transported by these discourses. I will then make the point that this coalescence provides the conditions of possibility for the anti-Israeli positioning of some youths who are both socially marginalized and members of Muslim communities in Germany.
Chapter 2: Becoming Muslim in Germany

Germany is an immigration country and today about 30% of youths come from immigrant communities. There are about four million Muslims from about 49 countries representing approximately 5% of the population (in 2010), of which only about 45% have obtained German citizenship (Haug et al. 2009).9 The social and historical context of immigration to Germany presents specific challenges for immigrant communities to establish access to institutional networks and resources. Although immigrants can be found at all levels of society, most immigrant families are positioned at the lower socioeconomic levels. Immigrants in Germany are twice as likely as other Germans to have incomes that are below the poverty line (32% of immigrants), have higher exposure to crime and violence, are three times as likely to be unskilled workers (44% of immigrants), experience twice the rate of unemployment (29% of immigrants), are 2.5 times as likely to drop out of high school (17.5% of immigrant students),10 and show a distinct pattern of lower educational achievement than students from families without immigrant background (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2007; Ohliger and Raiser 2005; Pfeiffer and Wetzels 2000; Stanat 2006; Stanat and Christensen 2006).11 There are segmented patterns for different immigrant communities, with Muslim12 immigrant communities showing lower social integration, educational achievement, and socioeconomic status than other immigrant communities (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007). These data suggest the low symbolic, cultural, and educational capital of youths from Muslim communities in Germany (Maaz et al. 2008).

Religious membership and orientation in Germany is generally characterized by heterogeneity: 63% of the population are Christian (Catholic and Protestant), while 34% of the population have no religious affiliation. About 5% of the population, 9 There are about 290,000 immigrants with Arab citizenship in Germany today, excluding those with German citizenship, Palestinians, and residents without citizenship. The total number of residents with Arab background can be assumed to be 600-800,000.
10 This value is based on data for students without German citizenship (as opposed to those with an immigrant background).
11 For all of these outcomes, there are segmented patterns for different immigrant groups. Immigrants with a Russian or Polish background are typically better off than immigrants with a Turkish or Italian background.
12 Turkish Germans and Turkish immigrants are the only Muslim immigrant communities who are well documented by census data. Census data for other groups of Muslims is scarce, but the government report “Muslims in Germany” indicates this pattern of low social integration to be true also for the small minority of Arab, African, and South Asian Muslims in Germany.
consisting predominantly of immigrants and their descendants, are Muslim. There is a wide variety of religious affiliation among Muslims. The 3.8 to 4.3 million Muslims who live in Germany today come from 49 different countries. In this context, the generic term “Muslim” ignores that Muslims in Germany have diverse ethnic backgrounds, religious and political orientations. Their ethnic and national diversity (Turks, “Arabs,” Iranians, Bosnians, Pakistanis, etc.) as well as religious diversity (74% Sunnites, 13% Alevites, 7% Shiites, 2% Ahmadiyya and other small communities) is great. In addition, there is a wide variety of Muslim religious practices, including, among others, conservative-orthodox orientations, liberal orientations of “Euro-Islam,” Islamic mysticism, and Islamist fundamentalism (AlSayyad and Castells 2002). Finally, the “silent majority” of “cultural Muslims,” liberal and largely non-religious members of Muslim immigrant communities who are nevertheless co-opted by mainstream coverage about the minorities of orthodox religious or fundamentalist Muslims, is also erased from this term (Akbarzadeh and Roose 2011).

The anthropological discussion is presently delineating the ways in which anti-Muslim and antisemitic discourse in Europe, and Germany, are intertwined and productive of each other (Bunzl and Senfft 2008; Bunzl 2005; Gingrich 2005; Glick Schiller 2005b; Halliday 1999; Özyrürek 2005; Stender 2010; Widmann 2008). The ascription of identity as “Muslim” in Germany today draws on complex and interwoven discourses around the issue of Europe’s “other” (Said 1979), Israel and Palestine, conflict, violence, hate, Jews and antisemitism (Abbas 2004; Ali 2012; Amir-Moazami 2005; Mythen et al. 2009; Schiffauer 2007). The master narratives of European countries today have been shown to be built on and synthesize accumulating hegemonic discourses about the civilizational, cultural, religious, ethnic, and political difference of Muslims (Asad 2003; Eksner and Bekerman submitted for review; Mignolo 1995 [2003]). The first hegemonic formation engenders a civilizational narrative, in which the West and its history is portrayed in its continuity with Judeo-Christian traditions and Occidental civilization. While these contours of a Judeo-Christian tradition have been called a “fictitious amalgam” almost synonymous with the similarly vague notion of “Western values,” this amalgam is a dominant hegemonic formation that entails an otherizing and re-orientalizing of Islam (Salvatore 2006). Based on a view of the inherited historical conflicts with Islam, “Western civilization” and “Islamic civilization” are presented as essentialized and
opposed entities whose traits are conferred on their populations (Featherstone 2009; Goody 2006; Said 1979), and the impossibility of value consensus between these entities is one of the core claims of this outlook (Huntington 1996). By extension, it is arguable that this formation ascribes essentialized political values to those entities: democratic values to those categorized as Western and Judeo-Christian, fundamentalist values to those categorized as Muslim.

An important aspect of the civilizational master narrative is a cultural narrative. A culturalized discourse about the “West,” which identifies specific “culture areas” (“Kulturkreise”), stems from the nineteenth century (Frobenius 1898) and continues to today with assertions of the importance of a local “guiding culture” (“Leitkultur”). The dichotomic positioning of “Western” culture as opposed to “Muslim-oriental culture” (Hüttermann 2011) represents one variation of a cultural-civilizational discourse specified and customized to national and regional contexts (Dumont 1986; Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006). Entailed in the civilizational-cultural narrative is also an implicit religious dimension that is based on the alleged “Judeo-Christian” civilizational roots of society. Importantly, as competing narratives are not mutually exclusive, the religious dimension of the construction of “Western” vs. “Islamic civilizations” coexists today with a narrative of the “West” as secular. A third hegemonic formation of citizenship is based on the master narrative of ethnicity. Although citizenship is seen as separate from nationality or ethnicity, in this narrative citizenship is implicitly linked to a racializing discourse (jus sanguinis), which assigns people to memberships in different groups based on their descendance from the blood of their parents (Aktürk 2011; James 1989; Sabean 1984). The ethnic master narrative sees an ethnic nation sharing a common descent (blood ties, jus sanguinis), and it is the ethnic nation, not the citizenry, which shapes the symbols, laws, and policies of the state.

The German narrative thus distinguishes strongly between members of the ethnic nation and non-members. Social closure to new members characterizes the German ethnic nation, (Turner 2007). Non-members of the ethnic nation are regarded as less desirable and as a serious threat to the survival and integrity of the ethnic nation. This threat is phrased in terms of “biological dilution, demographic swamping, cultural downgrading, security danger, subversion, and political instability” (Smooha 2002: 478) This perceived threat may additionally be seen as stemming from the ethnic affiliation of the non-dominant group with an external entity (a country, a homeland,
or a population) which is considered an enemy or “unfriendly agent” (Smooha 2002), such as the affiliation with “Islamic civilization/culture.” In Germany, the term “Muslim” today is then primarily an ideologically-saturated term that has come to replace the dominant term “foreigner” (“Ausländer”), which had been used to identify the perceived collective of immigrants and minorities in Germany until 2001.

Contemporary hegemonic discourse about Muslims builds on these intersecting and accumulating discourses of religion, ethnicity, culture, and political orientation. Stigmatizing portrayals of Muslims have been spread by the global media since the 1980s. They include the response to Salman Rushdie’s novel *The Satanic Verses*, the wide-scale 1990 demonstrations in support of Saddam Hussein, the 2005 Muhammad cartoon protests, the 2010 Florida Koran-burning protests, and most recently the global uproar over an amateur video defiling Muhammad and Islam that was actually covered under the sensationalist title “Muslim Rage” by the U.S. weekly *Newsweek* (Ali 2012; Lewis 1990). Global representations of Muslims carry connotations of a “clash of civilizations” (Huntington 1996), an idea that gained particular momentum following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States. Portrayals of Islam as archaic (Dalsheim 2010) and anti-Western position it as a possible threat to nation, state, and society. The 9/11 attack was the turning point towards the public construction of “the other” as “Muslim” (Abbas 2004; Brown 2006; Ewing 2008; Hilbert 2011; Mandel 2008).

In Germany, cases such as the Rütli Affair in Berlin, in which a working-class neighborhood high school requested to be shut down because they could not handle the alleged violence and aggression of their 100%-immigrant student body anymore, caused a national debate about the failed integration of Turkish and Arab youths in Germany and demonstrated the ways in which Muslims are “othered” and constructed as “dangerous” in the public debate (Hilbert 2011). Gendered accounts render young males deviant and aggressive, while women are conceived as passive or oppressed (Ewing 2008). The heated debate around Muslim religious and gender practices in Germany and the politicization of Islam in the context of global political developments has led to a discursive stigmatization of Islam and Muslim religious practices, and by implication membership, in Germany. These discourses reveal concerns about Muslims as segregated and not “integrated.” Underlying notions of assimilation place particular demands on them to demonstrate compliance with “German” culture and values (Adelson 2000; Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007; Caglar
Even though claims to secularist policies at the level of the European Union would imply equal opportunities and standing for all citizens and residents independent of religious affiliation, it has been demonstrated that the Euro-Christian roots of European “secularism” today often discriminate against religious minorities. As such, while Muslims may be accepted “in” Europe to varying degrees, Islam is not recognized as “of” Europe, i.e., as an indigenous religion (Asad 2003; Özyrürek 2005: 511f.).  

Thus, in a recent representative survey, 52.5% of German respondents agreed with the statement that “Islam is a religion of intolerance” mostly or totally, and 17.1% of Germans (and 22% of Europeans) agreed that “Most Muslims think that Islamist terror is legitimate” (Zick et al. 2011a). Muslim youths in Germany have been in particular linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constellation (Amadeu Antonio Stiftung 2012; Heyder et al. 2005; Riebe 2012). This contemporary discourse centrally includes the narrative of a conflicted relationship of (European) Muslims with Israel.

**Disintegration and the Development of Politicized Identities**

Muslim youths who grow up in Germany today are highly aware of these stigmatizing discourses and their lived effects. High school students who identified as Muslim and who were surveyed in a large-scale, representative study published by the German government perceived a collective disadvantage of Muslims in Germany (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007: 240). More than 30% of these students reported that they experience German society as disadvantageous for Muslims (among respondents of all ages, 50% reported this experience). Other recent studies found that many Muslims in Germany perceive that “Germans” have a negative image of Islam and that media reporting about Islam and Muslims is one-sided. Especially young people from Arab and Muslim immigrant communities frequently report experiences of stigmatization as “terrorists” and “fundamentalists.” Almost 85% of Muslim youths in this study  

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13 Two broad perspectives define the discussion about the role of Muslims and Islam in the European Union today. On the political right, Christianity is proclaimed to be the basis of European culture and civilization, and Islam is portrayed as an antithetical “other” to this culture. On the political left, Europe is characterized as secular, democratic, and as holding humanitarian, universalistic values. Islamic religious and gender practices are criticized as antithetical to these values, and repressive of the right of the individual to subscribe to secularist values. In sum, the public discourse of both the political left and the right is critical of the Muslim presence in Europe (Özyrürek 2005).
agreed that they were upset about the fact that after terrorist attacks the first suspected subjects were always Muslims, which is taken to reflect the perception of a global prejudice against Muslims (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007: 240).

Recent representative studies have found that in addition to antisemitic attitudes, anti-Muslim attitudes are widespread in Germany, as in other European countries (Zick et al. 2011). Empirical studies show that 27% of the general population in Germany consistently agrees with Islamophobic positions (Leibold and Kühnel 2008). As a result, a representative study of Muslim and non-Muslim citizens in Germany (both immigrants and non-immigrants) showed that Muslims in Germany report more experiences of discrimination and victimization than other immigrant groups. Two-thirds of Muslim respondents reported incidents of victimization or discrimination within the last year. Severe victimization experiences and severe physical attacks and damage to property were reported by 22% of the Muslim population in Germany. Youths in high school and students at university reported increased levels of discrimination and victimization, making age an additional vulnerability factor (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007). Thus, Muslim youths’ social positioning in Germany is characterized by disadvantage, even as ongoing demographic change is slowly eroding the formerly clear-cut majority-minority relationship. Muslim youths in Germany are then the subjects of a general disintegrative trend in both the socio-structural and institutional dimensions.

Youths from Muslim communities in Germany are then culturally and socially marginalized because of their ethnic and/or religious group membership. As ethnicized and marginalized youths they experience a particular set of ideological, discursive, and structural interpellations, and arrive at specific interpretations of society’s ascription of their own membership in minoritized groups, such as “foreigner,” “immigrant,” and “Muslim” – and the effects of these ascriptions on their lives. Because most Muslim youths are positioned as both working-class and ethnoculturally marginalized, they find themselves on the weaker side of a deep social antagonism within German society. Youths who grow up in this social and discursive context then face the challenge to come to a positive understanding of themselves, and to formulate and sustain positive identities as “Turkish Germans” or “German Muslims.”

It is in the context of these conditions that I would like to suggest that the anti-Israeli positioning primarily serves as an identity resource among (some) German
Muslim youths. The development of group-focused enmity has been extensively studied in relation to experiences of marginalization and stigmatization (Anhut and Heitmeyer 2000; Heitmeyer and Anhut 2008) and the findings establish that enmity against others does not come into existence independently of social contexts that provide frameworks for meaning-making about oneself and one’s experiences. The integration-disintegration framework theorizes the development of antisemitic attitudes – as one form of group-focused enmity – as connected to developmental processes. Successful social integration of individuals, and with this their socio-emotional development, is understood as depending on three dimensions: socio-structural, institutional, and socio-emotional integration (Anhut and Heitmeyer 2000; Heitmeyer and Anhut 2008). The socio-structural dimension refers to participation in society’s material and cultural goods. Sufficient access to work, housing, education, and consumer goods are basic elements of successful socio-structural integration. The individual’s satisfaction with his or her occupational and social position is a further necessary subjective element of this integration. Socio-structural integration is considered at risk if access to labor and consumption markets is structurally limited and social status is subjectively perceived as insufficient. The institutional dimension refers to institutional and political forms of participation. Society has to offer opportunities for participation, and individuals have to be willing to participate. Problems of disintegration in this dimension appear when individuals perceive a loss of moral recognition as actors with equal rights, and/or because of feelings of powerlessness in society. Institutional integration is considered at risk if there is a lack of participation in political decision-making processes or feelings of powerlessness with regard to these processes, or if an insufficient realization of basic norms is perceived. Finally, the socio-emotional dimension concerns emotional and expressive relations between people for the purpose of self-realization and making sense of life via values, belonging, and identities (Heitmeyer and Anhut 2008). Socio-emotional integration works primarily through group membership and identity, and is at risk if there is a lack or absence of support by social networks and a subjective feeling of loneliness.

A balance between these three dimensions is considered somewhat of a basic need, and “disintegration” (Heitmeyer and Anhut 2008) occurs if these three dimensions of integration are not sufficiently fulfilled in the lives of individuals. The mutual interrelatedness of these three dimensions implies that disintegrative
experiences in one of these dimensions will lead to increased efforts at integration in one of the other dimensions ("integration-disintegration dynamic") (Anhut and Heitmeyer 2000: 19). I would like to draw on this extensive line of research and theory development to suggest that the antisemitic attitudes of (some) German Muslim youths similarly have their origin in disintegrative processes. The section described how for many minoritized youths from Muslim communities in Germany, socio-structural and institutional integration is currently compromised, and that in order to cope with this disintegration, they balance this negative account via an increased emphasis of belonging to the ethnicized collective of “Muslims” in Germany.

In addition to socioeconomic marginalization, Muslim youths experience ethnocultural and religious marginalization. The development of positive group membership and identities (including ethnocultural and religious identities) is a precondition for successful socio-emotional integration of youths in society. In stark contrast to this need, the discursive stigmatization and social marginalization of Muslims may arguably be one of the main arenas of identity and boundary work being done in Germany today (Abbas 2012; Grosfoguel and Mielants 2006; Leibold and Kühnel 2008; Lopez 2011; Schiffauer 2007; The Runnymede Trust 1997).

Anhut and Heitmeyer (2000: 57f.) suggest that disintegrative experiences may be compensated in the domain of socio-emotional social integration, i.e., with an increased emphasis of belonging and integration into ethnicized collectives. Both the development of religious-fundamentalist and politicized identities as Muslims may thus function as coping-processes linked to the integration-disintegration dynamic described above. While minoritized youths’ possible ways of coping with disintegration are manifold, the emphasis of the socio-emotional dimension of integration via the formation of a Muslim counter-identity. The emphasis of a Muslim counter-identity understood primarily as a political identity occurs in the particular sociohistorical context of Germany, which discursively positions marginalized “Muslim” youths as antagonists of the State of Israel.

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14 Heitmeyer and Anhut (2008) theorize that the forms of coping that individuals choose under conditions of disintegration are “determined by the coincidence of their experiences (competencies, patterns of accountability, and so on) with specific opportunity structures such as integration into social milieus (group pressure, compulsion to conform) and the function of the chosen pattern of behavior in compensating for lack of recognition.”
The Shifting Meaning of Muslim Identities in Germany

In support of the present conceptualization, the authoritative study “Muslims in Germany” (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007) found that youths who reported high levels of stigmatization and experiences of discrimination also reported a high importance of Islam in their lives. Rather than serving as a religious orientation, these findings suggest that Islam may primarily function as a source of identity and self-positioning in a context of social exclusion and marginalization (Anhut and Heitmeyer 2000; Bundesministerium des Inneren 2011). This raises the underlying question of whether Islam in contemporary Germany has experienced a shift in meaning from religious practice to a politicized counter-identity of marginalized youths.

Experiences of disintegration also translate into youths’ own interpretations of their lives: Victimization is a core trope in the discourse of youths who identify as Muslim as political identity (Jikeli 2011; Karlin 2010; Mythen et al. 2009). I noted previously that two-thirds of Muslim respondents reported incidents of victimization or discrimination within the last year (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007), and that they are additionally socially and economically marginalized as carriers of highly stigmatized identities. There is evidence that the trope of victimization has become central to a shared counter-identity as Muslim – both in the context of German power relations as well as in the global arena. In the German context Muslim youths’ experiences of exclusion, discrimination, and stigmatization may lead to victimization identities, while the situation of Palestinians in the Middle East as well as the global stigmatization of Muslims in anti-Muslim and Islamophobic discourse allows youths to position Muslims as victims of global Western media reporting and the actions of the State of Israel. Forty-eight percent of students who identified as Muslim in a recent study stated that the “oppression of Muslims in Palestine” made them feel sad (p. 241), while 85% of respondents of all ages who identified as Muslim agreed with this statement (Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007). Qualitative studies and interventions conducted with Muslim youths in Germany identified a conspirational perception of a “war against Muslims” which the youths often phrased in religious terms. Because of the dichotomy of perpetrator and victim underlying the idea of victimization, these

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15 A methodological caveat is that the last statement is a single item out of a scale for which neither reliability nor validity is known. The finding might hence not be valid as reported.
16 Hence, this sentiment was in fact less expressed among the younger cohort.
ideas often include notions of “the Jews” or “the West” as perpetrators leading this war against Muslims (Jikeli 2011).

It is here suggested that Islam as politicized counter-identity – rather than religious practice – is of increasing relevance for the majority of second- and third-generation immigrants (AlSayyad 2002; Chervel 2007). German discourse assigns people to memberships in different groups, and youths from Muslim immigrant communities into the pan-ethnic and racialized category of “Muslim.” This creates a frame in which “being Muslim” becomes a salient category of self for youths from these communities (Dwyer 1998; Modood 1997a; Vertovec and Rogers 1998). In the absence of the possibility to self-identify as German in a context of exclusionary discourse, blood-based citizenship law (jus sanguinis), and/or complex naturalization requirements (Caglar 1997; Eksner 2006; Mushaben 2008), the identification as Muslim affords youths who are ascribed as such a fitting niche; a niche that is encouraged by the surrounding mainstream discourse, even as it is at the same time perceived as a counter-identity to the hegemonic secular-Christian identity (Amir-Moazami 2005).

There is accumulating evidence that the politicized counter-identities of (at least some) Muslim youths today are framed in particular orientation to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constellation. As outlined in the previous chapter, culturalist discourse based on age-old master narratives positions Muslim youths in enmity to Jews. In addition, educators and social workers identify a parallelism between the youths’ experiences as members of a marginalized and disenfranchised Muslim minority in Germany and the situation experienced by the Palestinian “Muslims” of Israel and the Palestinian Territories. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is then presented as a placeholder conflict, onto which the youths are thought to project their experiences of marginalization and exclusion. The orientation of youths’ identities towards this conflict may then serve as a means of identification and solidarity among marginalized and ethnicized Muslim youths in Germany (Eksner 2010; Müller 2009). While other possibilities of responding to their marginalization do exist (such as, for example, the emergence of a social movement for destigmatization and the rights of minorities within Germany), the argument made here proposes that youths’ identification as Muslims and against Israel is by no means “natural,” but that youths’ responses are structured by their positioning in preexisting discursive relations.
between Germans and “others” and between “Jews” and “Muslims.” Both the ethnicized long-distance nationalism regarding the Palestinian Territories of youths from Palestinian and Lebanese communities in Germany (Glick Schiller 2005a; Glick Schiller 2010), as well as the “Ummatic” solidarity (Abbas 2012) of Muslim youths in Germany with Muslims in Israel and the Palestinian Territories, are in agreement with, and legitimized by, German discourse about Muslims and their essentialized relationship to Israel and Palestine. Nestled in the intersecting strands of antisemitic and anti-Muslim discourse in Germany, Muslim youths are thus afforded a fitting niche from which to construct their counter-identities as Muslims in Germany and from which to position themselves as antagonists of the State of Israel.
Chapter 3: Summary and Conclusions

This paper has contextualized and deconstructed the phenomenon of anti-Israeli positioning among (some) Muslim youths in Germany.

The overview of the empirical literature on antisemitism in Germany provided here strongly indicates that the distribution, expression, and emergence of antisemitic attitudes among Muslim-oriented youths in Germany have not been understood as yet. While the survey and qualitative research clearly shows that there are youths from Muslim communities who hold and express antisemitic beliefs, it also shows that they do so to differing degrees and with different ideologies of legitimization. Further, the available evidence from representative studies shows that an increase in antisemitic attitudes is generally associated with lower educational background, fear of social derailment, as well as Muslim and Christian religious orientation (as opposed to religious membership) (Bundesministerium des Inneren 2011; Zick et al. 2011b: 93). Educational interventions and qualitative studies conducted among Muslim-oriented youths (primarily in Berlin) similarly provide mounting evidence that expressions of antisemitism among Muslim-oriented youths in Germany are closely linked to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constellation. These studies found that in the group of Muslim-oriented youths antisemitism is characterized not so much by traditional antisemitic stereotypes (that would indicate “culturally transmitted” Muslim antisemitism) but rather by one-sided critiques of Israel that make recourse to antisemitic discourse. The actual spread and distribution of Israel-directed negative attitudes among Muslim youths in Germany is, however, not known at this point. The evidence provided by the quantitative studies on the role of social derailment and lower educational background indicates that there seem to be two main process pathways that connect Muslim youths and antisemitic attitudes: first, fundamentalist-religious orientation, and second, experiences of social exclusion and marginalization. These are important contributing factors for antisemitic attitudes among all social groups in Germany, including Muslims. The latter pathway appears, in some instances, to additionally draw on patterns and tropes of the former (why and how is understudied as yet). Yet the quantitative findings indicate that in terms of association, they appear at this point to be distinct processes. Because a range of studies have already considered “ethnocultural” and religious explanations for antisemitism among Muslim youths, this paper examined experiences of
marginalization specific to the German context as conditions of possibility for the development of Israel-directed antisemitism among Muslim youths in Germany.

Chapter 2 outlined the discursive and social processes that gave rise to a specifically connotated Muslim counter-identity among youths in Germany. The paper took an ecocultural perspective on the closely interlinked development of identity and affect among adolescents by considering the social and discursive context underlying the positioning of youths from Muslim communities in Germany, and the meaning these youths make of these positions. It was discussed how the marginalization and stigmatization inherent in insufficient structures and processes of social integration are linked to the emergence of a Muslim counter-identity in Germany, which again is linked to the negotiation and redefinition of power relations between dominant and minoritized groups. The emergence of this Muslim counter-identity was shown to be particular to the social context and historical time of contemporary Germany. The counter-identity has strong discursive ties to the State of Israel and draws on current secondary antisemitic and anti-Muslim discourses in Germany. The literature review establishes that this counter-identity is shared by only a small proportion of Muslim youths in Germany. However, this paper suggests that anti-Israeli orientations among Muslim youths are fruitfully explored as a minoritarian counter-identity that draws on discourses of victimization shared by minoritized Muslim youths in Germany and Palestinians/Muslims in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constellation.

In this last section I would like to finally focus the argument on how these emerging Muslim counter-identities become coopted by political movements and antisemitic ideologies. The positioning against the State of Israel was shown to be in line with both mainstream German secondary antisemitic attitudes and the discursive positioning of Muslim youths as invested “cousins” of the Palestinian and Muslim population of Israel and the Palestinian Territories. The German social and discursive context both legitimizes the critique of Israel and naturalizes Muslim youths’ anti-Israeli attitudes. The expression of anti-Israeli positioning is then enabled by social movement activists who provide a meaningful framework for youths’ making meaning of their experiences (Schiffauer 2004). Their antagonistic positioning via a politicized Muslim identity is only then co-opted by anti-Israeli political actors. German media coverage regularly feeds on the shock value of anti-Israeli
demonstrations (which is exactly what social movement activists are looking for), while it at the same time reifies and confirms the hegemonic discourse about the unrestrained antisemitism and political extremism of Muslim youths in Germany, thus feeding into an accelerating discourse about the virulent antisemitism of Muslim youths in Germany. In this way anti-Israeli positioning of Muslim youths in Germany is misunderstood as unrestrained antisemitism instead of a politicized counter-identity linked to shared marginalization experiences.

The main point made here is, however, that it is in tandem with the discursive production of politicized and antagonistic Muslim counter-identities associated with a worldview of victim-perpetrator relations among a subgroup of Muslim youths that a co-optation of these politicized identities into an ideologized and antisemitic worldview becomes possible. This co-optation is facilitated by the fact that both German “Israelkritik” and the anti-Israeli political movement make recourse to secondary antisemitic discourse. Crucially then, while this subgroup of Muslim youths may employ antisemitic tropes, the process pathways to this final outcome are to be identified in societal discourse and marginalization processes. Emphatically, this does not legitimize antisemitism among politicized Muslims. However, the point advanced here is that the genesis of anti-Israeli positioning among (some) Muslim youths is distinct from the simpler narratives about an ethnocultural transmission of “Muslim antisemitism” in immigrant families from Muslim countries, or a naturalized secondary antisemitism of Muslim youths in Germany that is seen as rooted in their “natural” positioning in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

It remains the unique feature of the German case that youths’ responses to a perceived moral injustice, which emerge as a result of perceived marginalization and victimization in the context of German dominant–non-dominant relations, are projected onto the State of Israel. It is a particularly interesting variation on the theme of politicized identities that can be observed in the particular case of Muslim youths in Germany: while Muslim youths are marginalized as Muslims and minorities in Germany, the expression of antagonism is rarely publicly directed against the German state and/or Germans. The absence of a large-scale social movement that represents the rights of minorities and is carried by minorities themselves is painfully obvious in the German case. I would like to suggest that the expression of antagonistic positioning of marginalized and stigmatized Muslim youths against the German State and German society is delegitimized by German discourse, law, and an executive that
punishes unruly minority youths heavy-handedly (as is evidenced by disproportionally high arrest and imprisonment rates for immigrant youths, including Muslim youths [Brettfeld and Wetzels 2007; Pfeiffer and Wetzels 2000]). In contrast – and as was elaborated above – the expression of resentment against the State of Israel is in line with both mainstream German secondary antisemitic attitudes and the discursive positioning of Muslim youths as “cousins” of the Palestinian and Muslim population of Israel and the Palestinian Territories. In effect, German social and discursive context both legitimizes the critique of Israel and naturalizes Muslim youths’ anti-Israeli attitudes, and thus channels the expression of righteous anger from the object much closer to home (both literally and figuratively) to its “legitimized” transnational object, i.e., the State of Israel and, by implication, its Jewish citizens. Muslim youths’ counter-identities that are based on inner-German power inequality are assimilated and contained by German mainstream discourse as their projection onto the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ultimately serves to stabilize unequal power structures within Germany.

Finally, I would like to clarify how the analyses just completed speak to the issue of antisemitism among Muslim youths in Germany today. It is my hope that I have provided evidence in this paper that the category of “Muslim antisemitism” is not the appropriate concept to capture the attitudes and motivations of (some) young Muslims in Germany who position themselves against the State of Israel. I attempted to show that both the conditions of existence as well as youths’ attitudes have emerged as distinct from the simple category of “(Muslim) antisemitism.” Nevertheless, and importantly, the literature discussed also provided evidence that the majority of those who hold anti-Israeli positions also have antisemitic beliefs, and that both “Israelkritik” and anti-Israeli positioning among Muslim youths make recourse to antisemitic tropes. This relationship is important to understand and warrants further investigation. The current public debate in Germany tends to displace the phenomenon of antisemitism onto the population of Muslims, while antisemitism as a problem that is deeply ingrained in the fabric of German society and other forms of relations between German Muslims and the imagined Other Israel become erased. What is needed now are historical accounts that detail the chronology of the emergence of different genres of antisemitic discourse among Muslims in Germany, including religious, ethnocultural, and political varieties, and how these are intertwined and borrow from each other. Further, as an anti-essentializing and anti-
racist measure, it is important to determine the actual distribution of different facets of antisemitism among subgroups of Muslim youths as defined by ethnicity, religious orientation, age, political orientation, and socioeconomic status. These questions and relations are important areas for future research. The purpose of the present article was to serve as a stepping stone to such inquiries.

**Addendum: Educational Openings**

Germany is an immigration country and educators in urban schools in contemporary Germany teach a diverse group of students who represent the overall diversity of Germany’s population. Due to the educational tracking-system and residential clustering of immigrant communities in urban centers (Eksner and Stanat 2011), urban classrooms are today often composed in their majority of students from Muslim families from Germany’s largest immigrant groups (Statistisches Bundesamt 2008).25 Primary policy attention in combating antisemitism today is directed towards youths from Muslim communities, both because in this particular era demographic educational interventions are thought to be able to successfully counteract the “cultural transmission” of antisemitic beliefs in Muslim families, and because Muslim youth in Germany are considered a particularly unsettled and politically incitable group (Müller 2007b; Müller et al. 2008). However, transmission pathways and conditions of emergence of German Muslim youths’ positioning against the State of Israel have not been identified. Consequently, the group of Muslim youths is only one target group to be addressed by interventions if the processes outlined here are to be addressed. Based on this analysis, this paper suggests several alternative approaches for preventative interventions with Muslim-oriented youths, both in educational settings and out of school.

**Diversity vs. Integration**

As this paper has shown, the development of politicized Muslim counter-identities, and with it, the development of anti-Israeli positioning and politicized antisemitism, is closely linked to the disintegrative experiences of Muslim youths in German society. Integration, understood as an opening to a diversity perspective in German society, is therefore seen as the most important intervention for thwarting the development of radicalized counter-identities. Only through political, social, economic, and cultural
efforts on the part of the dominant non-Muslim society can a process of societal integration take place that allows for a cultural, structural, social, and identity-related integration of Muslims in Germany. In order to prevent radicalization processes and facilitate such integration, initiatives are needed that allow for the construction and consolidation of a positive bicultural identity of Muslims in Germany. The precondition for this is that young Muslims are enabled to have a positive orientation both to German culture and to their families’ traditions and religion. State, society, and public discourse have to allow for these bicultural, and hybrid, orientations, affiliations, and allegiances. A prerequisite for this is an understanding of Germany as a diverse society in which citizens from different cultural backgrounds contribute to what it means to be German today and are able to engage in transversal citizenship, i.e., are able to retain multiple ethnic and religious identities, but at the same time are full citizens willing to engage in dialogue with other citizens’ identities and values (Fridt et al. 2012; Terkessidis 2010; Yuval-Davis 1999).

Ascription of Stigmatized Identities onto Muslim Youths: Teacher Trainings

Teachers and schools represent perhaps the most important point of contact of minoritized youths with mainstream German society. Teachers and schools are important institutions for the transmission of students’ identities and experiences of integration into society. Further, teachers’ (negative) beliefs about their students have been shown to be internalized by students (Delpit 1995; Greenberg et al. 2003; Jussim 1989). In this vein, one study showed that in the face of contradicting data about the attitudes of their Muslim students (which were not antisemitic), the mostly autochthonous German teachers of these students defined antisemitism as the problem of “Muslim students,” influenced by the widespread mass media discourse on “Muslim antisemitism” in the phrasing of their words (Stender and Follert 2010: 201). Most importantly, students who are ascribed with stigmatized identities that position them as Muslim, anti-Western, anti-Israeli, and antisemitic respond to these positionings. Urgently needed at this point are teacher trainings for teachers of all backgrounds, but especially for autochthonous German teachers, that sensitize them to these hegemonic stigmatizing discourses about Islam, Muslims, and minorities and allow them to explore and critically reflect on their implicit beliefs and classroom practices (Bekerman and Zembylas 2011; Bekerman et al. 2009; Zembylas and Bekerman 2008).
Classroom Interventions: Reasoning vs. Emotions

Classroom interventions against antisemitic attitudes in German classrooms take a cognitive approach in which demonization, double standards, and delegitimization are perceived as central cognitive processes of secondary antisemitism. Educational interventions attempt to dismantle these in order to address secondary antisemitism among youths in general, and Muslim youths in particular. Students in German classrooms are encouraged to have “discussions” and to “present their arguments,” which educators then strive to deconstruct by having “informed” discussions that are based on historical and political facts that they present. Unsurprisingly, the effects of these interventions are typically disconcertingly short-lived (petering out at around three months after the intervention (Dixon et al. 2005; Maoz 2011; Salomon and Kupermintz 2002).

The educational response to what are categorized as antisemitic beliefs among youths today is primarily cognitive, addressing the arguments used in antisemitic discourse to demonize and delegitimize the State of Israel and its citizens. The affective dimension underlying antisemitic rationalizations, i.e., the motivating force that propels this reasoning into action and that provides it with emphatic power, is missing. As this article has argued, a core problem to be understood and addressed by educators is not the secondary, rational legitimization of this affective process, but anger about a violation of the moral order that is socially legitimized and projected onto the constructed “other” of the Israeli/Jew.

Prior research has shown that a useful educational response to this “pressure cooker” scenario is to allow youths to voice their fears and experiences regarding victimization. Research on the psychology of intergroup conflict shows that before an understanding of the “other” can be proposed, it is necessary to first hear the concerns and experiences of those who perceive themselves to be victims (Hammack 2010; Karlin 2010; Kelman 1999). The – real or perceived – threat of victimization activates defense mechanisms, which prohibit youths from empathizing with the “other.” Thus educational interventions have to allow for a consideration of the youths’ own experiences and emotions, particularly as they related to their coming of age as members of marginalized and ethnicized groups in Germany.

17 A second line of interventions, though much less common, builds on the contact hypothesis and provides the opportunity for contact between Arab and/or Muslim youths, respectively, and Jews in order for both groups to be confronted with real people instead of their projections.
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Muslim Youths in Germany and the Question of Israel-Directed Antisemitism: The Developmental and Discursive Context of a Phenomenon

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